28 pages • 56 minutes read
Thomas NagelWhat Is It Like to Be a Bat?
Nonfiction | Essay / Speech | Adult | Published in 1974A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Themes
The Unbridgeable Gap Between the Objective and Subjective
Nagel argues that irrespective of how sophisticated our scientific methodologies and tools become, they inevitably fall short in penetrating and comprehending the subjective realm of another creature’s conscious experience. Nagel explores further the insurmountable limitation of objective analysis when understanding subjective experiences.
At the heart of Nagel’s essay lies a thought experiment: What is it like to be a bat? The philosopher maintains that no matter how much we study the bat’s biology (such as echolocation and behavior) or employ imagination, we cannot fully comprehend a bat’s experience: “To the extent that I could look and behave like a wasp or a bat without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences would not be anything like the experiences of those animals” (439). Here Nagel invites readers to explore the chasm between understanding a bat from an external perspective and knowing what it is like subjectively to be a bat. In doing so, Nagel illustrates the gap between objectivity and subjectivity. In his essay, the bat analogy illuminates the limitations of objective analysis in the study of subjective experience.
Nagel’s choice of words and syntactical structure further underscore the limitations of objective analysis. He states: “Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what it is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed” (437). Nagel’s use of formal and exact language highlights the inherent limitation of the scientific method when it tries to approach the realm of subjective experience from an objective standpoint.
Nagel uses allusion to reference philosophical theories about consciousness: “Without some idea, therefore, of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of a physicalist theory” (437). Through this allusion to physicalist theory, he emphasizes the difficulty of explaining consciousness in purely physical terms, thereby highlighting the central theme of his essay.
Through thought experiments, precise language, and the use of rhetorical devices, Nagel argues that the realm of subjective consciousness is intrinsically resistant to objective scientific exploration. The principal takeaway from Nagel’s essay is an understanding that our perception of the world, and even more so of other conscious beings, is fundamentally restricted by our subjective human experience. This realization prompts a deeper appreciation of the mystery of consciousness and the need to acknowledge our inherent limitations in understanding the subject. Bringing to light the subjective lens through which we perceive the world and our surroundings, Nagel’s essay explores the enigma of consciousness.
The Nature of Subjective Experience
Nagel confronts the reader with an assertion: Subjective experience is inherently unknowable, and it cannot be gleamed by observation. This forms the crux of his argument, which challenges reductionist theories of mind.
In the context of Nagel’s essay, reductionism refers to the philosophical stance that complex systems can be understood by reducing them to their simpler counterparts. This approach is often applied in the sciences. Nagel challenges this reductionist approach when it comes to consciousness. He argues that consciousness, due to its inherently subjective nature, cannot be fully understood by reducing it to simpler, objective components like neuronal activity. While acknowledging that reductionist methods can provide important insights into the workings of the brain, Nagel suggests that they fall short of capturing the full depth and complexity of subjective experience. Through this exploration, Nagel underscores the limits of human understanding and the inherent uniqueness of individual consciousness.
Nagel crafts his assertion of unknowability through the metaphor of a bat’s experience. He states: “Even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a bat, I would learn nothing about what it is like to be a bat that I don’t know already” (439). His point that a gradual transformation would not aid in understanding the bat’s experience speaks to the subjective experience’s inherent mystery. The diction of “gradual degrees” and “transformed” emphasizes the vast divide between human and bat experiences.
Nagel further deploys a rhetorical strategy to underscore the opacity of subjective experience. Nagel frequently alludes to “sonar experiences,” which bats rely on for navigation. He asserts: “In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat” (439). This distinction, drawn through Nagel’s reflective tone, highlights the insurmountable gulf between merely behaving like another being and truly experiencing the world as they do.
Nagel appeals to logic, exposing the inherent insufficiency of objective analysis in understanding subjective experiences. He uses careful syntax: “But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism” (436). This statement, phrased as a logical condition, affirms that consciousness—and thus subjective experience—is not merely an observable phenomenon but something intrinsic and unique to each organism.
The takeaway from Nagel’s exploration is twofold: Firstly, the essay questions the philosophical adequacy of reductionist theories that attempt to explain consciousness solely in terms of physical processes. Secondly, it underscores an essential humility in our quest for knowledge, recognizing the inherent limits of understanding others’ experiences. As Nagel writes: “Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited” (439). Far from being a surrender, recognizing our limitations prompts us to develop more nuanced understandings of consciousness and subjective experience.
Embracing the Unknowable
Nagel investigates consciousness and its inherent mysteries. A central theme in his discourse is “embracing the unknowable,” a concept that tests the boundaries of human understanding and calls into question the overarching certainty often associated with reductionist viewpoints.
The metaphor of the bat’s subjective experience conveys this theme. Nagel asserts that “bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine” (438). By encouraging the reader to imagine what it is like to rely on sonar as a sense, Nagel illustrates the unknowable nature of the bat’s experience. The implication that even our most imaginative efforts fall short in understanding other consciousness encourages readers to acknowledge this inherent mystery.
Nagel uses a distinctive choice of words. He states: “If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity […] does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon” (444). The phrases “fully comprehensible” and “real nature of the phenomenon” underscore the inaccessibility of subjective experiences. Nagel’s choice of words emphasize the constraints of human comprehension, inviting readers to respect these boundaries.
Employing a tone of contemplative inquiry, Nagel appeals to reason as he distinguishes between human assumptions and actual understanding. He ponders: “But what would be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat?” (443). Through this rhetorical question, Nagel points out that our comprehension remains incomplete without a bat’s perspective.
Nagel challenges the sense of complete understanding often found in reductionist perspectives. Furthermore, he argues that accepting the mystery of other beings is an integral aspect of the human condition, fostering intellectual humility. As he writes, “there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language” (441). This encourages us to acknowledge our limitations, fostering curiosity and respect for the complex, often elusive realm of subjective experience.
In conclusion, Nagel prompts readers to rethink their understanding of consciousness and the boundaries of human comprehension. Through his rhetoric and reasoning, he encourages readers to grapple with the enigmas of subjective experience.
