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Thomas L. FriedmanA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
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Friedman argues that three significant things happened around the year 2000 to further flatten the world.
First, the ten flatteners began to “work together in ways that created a new, flatter, global playing field” (202). They worked like complementary goods, each becoming something more when it worked in tandem with the others. The Web created a new platform for working and connecting people around the world.
The second convergence happened when people adopted new habits and methods for doing business: they moved from vertical to horizontal ways of adding value. This “horizontalization” took over gradually; people continued to rely on old habits and ways of doing things until they became familiar with the new technology and started to incorporate it into their workflow. In the process, the technology changed the workflow. As Friedman states, many of the flatteners he describes have existed for years. Their full potential only emerges when people and organizations “get comfortable with, and develop, the sorts of horizontal collaboration and value-creation processes and habits that could take advantage of this new, flatter playing field” (207).
The third convergence came about as billions of people around the globe gained the opportunity to join economic activity. For decades after World War II, the United States, Europe, and Japan dominated the capitalist world economy. The rest of the world was largely controlled by closed, vertical, and hierarchical systems. With the fall of communism, these restrictions fell away, and by the 1990s the pool of available talent was greatly expanded. Because of the flattened world, members of this new workforce could stay in their native countries and contribute from there. Friedman argues that “new players, on a new playing field, developing new processes and habits for horizontal collaboration” will have a profound impact on the economy and politics of the 21st century (211). Many of these new players come from countries with a strong tradition of education—China, India, and Russia—so they are well prepared and eager to prove themselves, especially after the fall of their countries’ stifling policies.
Friedman predicts that top-down hierarchical organizations like the WTO will have less impact on the global economy in the future than individuals like the “Zippies.” These are young people in India “with a zip in the[ir] stride” who are ready for fresh challenges (215). He tells the story of one such person, Rajesh Rao, the head of a gaming company called Dhruva Interactive in Bangalore. Dhruva found its niche as “a provider of game development services,” taking on outsourced work from the United States (218) and finally catching the attention of important players in the industry with a demo of a Wild West game called Saloon. Rao explains that his company’s success could only have occurred in a flat world: The Internet allowed Dhruva employees to research everything about the Wild West without ever setting foot in America; the infrastructure of fiber-optic cable allowed them enough bandwidth to e-mail large files; and common applications like Microsoft Word and 3D Studio MAX allowed them to work with the same set of tools their customers in the United States use. This is what Friedman refers to as “plug and play” capability, and young people in China and Russia are now catching up to those in India.
This chapter discusses the changes needed for individuals, businesses, and nations to adapt to the horizontal nature of the flat world after so many years of vertical structures. Friedman learns that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels described a flat world a century and a half ago in their book The Communist Manifesto. He quotes a passage from their book that describes the role of capitalism in reducing the friction created by national boundaries and traditional systems like religion, barriers that the authors argue will eventually be erased. From here, Friedman weighs the pros and cons of doing away with the old structures versus keeping some of them.
The world and how we interact with it will change as the flattening effects intensify. Friedman uses his own profession as an example of this: The newspaper industry is undergoing a profound shift as Google siphons off ad revenue and more readers consume their news online. As a result, “[s]ome people will respond to this disintegrating phase with a sense of exhilaration and freedom—seeing an opportunity to soar, expand, dig, or build in any direction with a whole new set of tools. Others will react with the anxiety of people in free fall, with nothing to hold them up or in place” (238).
The nation state is the largest and main source of friction within a flat world. As a flat world seeks to level everything, which protections will we want to preserve? (After all, some protections, such as copyrights and worker protections, are beneficial.) Certain mutually agreed upon norms and standards must be kept, but which ones and how? Some argue that specific communities will answer these questions for themselves, like eBay did when it adopted a system of buyer and seller ratings to inspire trust in its business model. However, Friedman cautions that a self-governing system can be subverted. Models that blend old and new methods will likely be adopted to provide better protections than a self-governing system.
Friedman uses an example from the state of Indiana to illustrate how tricky the new flat-world environment can be. In 2003, the state sought bids to upgrade its computer system that processes unemployment claims. The winner was the United States subsidiary of the Indian firm Tata. A political backlash ensued, and the Democratic governor canceled the contract after receiving criticism from Republicans. Almost $1 million was reportedly paid to Tata for work already performed, and the rest of the job was divided up into smaller projects that Indiana-based firms could take on at a higher cost to taxpayers. Friedman challenges the reader to question who was exploiting whom in this story. One might argue that Indiana should protect state workers from outsourcing to underpaid Indian workers, but a counterargument would be that Indian workers should be given an opportunity to compete for lucrative jobs. Is free trade or some level of protectionism the answer?
Another confusing issue in a flat world is the relationship between companies and communities. As the “home nation” of multinational companies becomes increasingly hard to define, where these companies’ loyalties lie will need to be sorted out. Take computer company Lenovo for example. It was created in 2004 when a Chinese firm acquired IBM’s personal computer business. IBM purchased almost one-fifth of Lenovo’s stock, and the new company was led by a mix of executives from both IBM and the Chinese firm that became Lenovo. It was hard to pin down which country Lenovo was headquartered in because it had offices around the world.
The flat world may be great for capital but less advantageous for individuals— citizens, workers, consumers, taxpayers, etc.; therefore, individuals, too, will need to sort out their various identities in a flat world. Friedman compares Walmart and Costco to illustrate his point. Overall, Walmart provides fewer employee benefits than Costco does, so one could argue that Costco is better for workers. However, providing fewer employee benefits allows Walmart to have a higher profit margin, which is beneficial to shareholders. On the other hand, by providing the lowest possible prices for consumer items, Walmart indirectly benefits its employees. As one economist noted, “[a]s a force for poverty relief, Wal-Mart's $200 billion-plus assistance to consumers may rival many federal programs” (251).
Finally, there’s the issue of how people feel in a world that values nothing but the lowest costs and highest profits. The human touch is often missing in a world like that, and people can feel out of sorts with this loss of community. A friend complains to Friedman that companies cut out all the fat to become as lean as possible, but fat is what gives meat its taste. In this metaphor, “fats” are the intangibles that give life meaning.
In Chapter 3, Friedman’s point in discussing a “triple convergence” is twofold. First, the ten flatteners had a tremendous impact on the world because they worked together, not separately. Second, their potential took time to come to fruition because the process involved changing people’s habits and work patterns. When everything did come together, “millions of people on different continents suddenly started to feel that something . . . something . . . was new” even if they couldn’t quite identify it yet. (204).
In Chapter 4, Friedman squarely addresses the downsides of a flat world—especially for individuals. People’s support systems—what Friedman calls “walls, ceilings, and floors” (236)—will mostly fall away, leaving them vulnerable.
Friedman doesn’t provide answers in these chapters. Instead, he poses questions that everyone will have to grapple with—in what he calls “the great sorting out.” The profound changes caused by a flat world will include fundamental changes to the identities of both individuals and companies. Where our loyalties lie and how that will affect the decisions we make is something we must sort out.
By Thomas L. Friedman