52 pages • 1 hour read
Adam SmithThe Theory of Moral Sentiments
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1759A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Key Figures
Adam Smith
Born in Kirkaldy, Scotland, near Edinburgh, in 1723, Adam Smith found his way to the University of Glasgow, where he came under the tutelage of Dr. Francis Hutcheson, who is best known for his “moral sense” theory and one of the foremost minds of the Scottish Enlightenment. From there, Smith went to Oxford before returning to Scotland and eventually back to the University of Glasgow as a professor of logic. By the time he succeeded Hutcheson as chair of moral philosophy, Smith already was well known in Scottish intellectual circles, particularly the close-knit community of writers who made Glasgow and Edinburgh such vibrant hubs of Enlightenment thought. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) made Smith famous well beyond Scotland’s borders.
Today, Smith is remembered primarily as the author of An Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), wherein he explodes the centuries-old economic theory of mercantilism and argues instead for economic freedom. The Theory of Moral Sentiments established the theoretical foundation for that later and more influential book.
Francis Hutcheson
Author of An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), an Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections (1728), the three-volume A System of Moral Philosophy (1755), and other books and essays, Dr. Francis Hutcheson served as chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. It was there, in 1737, that he encountered a young Adam Smith. By all accounts, Hutcheson was an engaging and innovative teacher. He was also a devout Christian who, notwithstanding clerical opposition, hoped to bring the Scottish Presbyterian Church in line with the humane ideals of the Scottish Enlightenment.
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Hutcheson appears as “the most acute, the most distinct,” as well as “the soberest and most judicious” of all philosophers, “ancient or modern,” who have grounded their theories of virtue in benevolence (277). Hutcheson’s “moral sense” argument holds that human beings, whatever their vices, are fundamentally good, and they are so because they possess something akin to a natural sense of morality. Smith accepts Hutcheson’s assertion that we derive our moral judgments from faculties implanted by nature. Smith also shares Hutcheson’s faith in a benevolent God. However, Smith does not equate moral judgment with one of the known senses, nor does he follow Hutcheson in dismissing self-love as a possible source of virtuous action.
David Hume
Author of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Political Discourses (1752), the six-volume History of England (1754-61), and many other writings, David Hume ranks among modernity’s most influential philosophers. Hume had a significant impact on his younger friend and colleague, Adam Smith, who adopted some of Hume’s ideas and modified others, though Smith did not share his friend Hume’s religious skepticism.
Hume is not named in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, yet his influence is apparent throughout the book. Hume departs from much of early modern Western philosophy in general, and from Francis Hutcheson in particular, when he argues that human beings are not governed primarily by reason, nor are they predominantly good. They are instead slaves to their passions, motivated almost exclusively by self-interest. Furthermore, there is nothing anyone can do or should try to do to eradicate or soften this self-interested element in our natures. The best we can hope is that societies will erect institutions that channel man’s innate selfishness into peaceful and productive ends. Smith agrees that self-interest has its benefits; he even views self-interest as a possible source of virtuous action. He does not, however, reduce the entire moral question to self-interest.
