The Prince

“The usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling power.”

According to Machiavelli, it is usually the case that those states which have been annexed by a prince will welcome foreign powers in to take over because of the hatred they feel toward the prince. To combat this, he recommends that the prince make himself the head and defender of his less powerful neighbors, weaken the more powerful amongst them, and take care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there. 

“The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame.” 

Machiavelli refers to the fact that it is human nature to want to obtain things, in this case territorial expansion. When princes do this successfully, they are praised, but when they try to and fail, they are blamed. This reflects the author’s broader philosophy of political realism, in which ethics are subordinate to acquiring and maintaining power. 

“He who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to power.” 

In closing Chapter 3, Machiavelli discusses the mistakes made by King Louis VII in Italy. King Louis gained power and allies in Italy, but he blundered in many ways, like when he allied with Pope Alexander VI. In doing this, he allowed the church to become more powerful than himself and his other allies. 

“He who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget.”

In Chapter 5, Machiavelli examines how to govern principalities where citizens lived under their own laws before they were annexed. Because states which operated as free republics can be governed by its own citizens, he recommends eliminating the previous state’s leadership and rules as the very first step. Otherwise, citizens will quickly rebel against the invading leader.

“A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it.” 

Machiavelli explores new principalities that have been won by skill in Chapter 6. Princes who come to power because of their own prowess rather than by the arms of others or by fortune typically face difficulty in acquiring a state but less trouble in maintaining them. Therefore, Machiavelli recommends imitating the actions taken by other great leaders who rose in a similar fashion. Even when the prince’s skill is inferior to men such as Cyrus and Romulus, if one follows their paths they will at least be making decisions based on their success. 

“He who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building.”

Princes who rise to power through fortune or through the arms of others typically have little trouble in acquiring states but great difficulty in maintaining them. Machiavelli argues that the reason for this is either because they are dependent on others for defense or because they do not have the knowledge and skill to be in that position. Therefore, these princes must take care to prepare themselves beforehand because while it may be possible to lay those foundations afterwards, it will bring danger to himself and his state. 

“He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries is deceived.”

This quote refers directly to Cesare Borgia, who had great success as a prince but ultimately lost power because he allowed Julius II, a former enemy of his family, to become Pope. Borgia likely thought that in allowing Julius II to become Pope all would be forgiven. However, as Machiavelli explains, that is not the case with people of great stature. 

“Injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavor of them may last longer.” 

Chapter 8 explores princes who came to power through wickedness. Rising to power in this way lacks virtue and it will undoubtedly injure many of the prince’s subjects. Although Machiavelli stresses that such a rise to power will not bring glory, he recommends that if a prince goes that route to establish power, he should commit the evil acts all at one time so that there will be time to heal. On the other hand, he recommends that benefits to his subjects should be doled out gradually over time so that they are wanted and appreciated. 

“He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favor finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.”

In Chapter 9, Machiavelli discusses civil principalities. Civil principalities are those in which a private citizen rises to power through the favor of his fellow citizens. Those who have become princes in this way did so either because the common people promoted him, or the nobles did. Machiavelli explains that those who were promoted by the nobles have a more difficult time because the nobles will not obey him and see themselves as equal to him. 

“One cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed.” 

Machiavelli refers to the dichotomy that exists between the nobles and the common people in civil principalities. He argues that the common people only want not to be oppressed by the nobles, but the nobles only want to oppress the people. In this regard, the goal of the common people is a righteous one while the goal of the nobles is not. In order to satisfy the nobles, you must injure the common people; but satisfying the common people is possible without injury to anyone. 

“A wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.” 

In civil principalities, particularly those transitioning to the rule of a prince, it is critical that a prince work to win the support of the people, but he should not be gullible about the reliability of that support. Machiavelli argues that the people will be with the prince in quiet times, but he can find few friends among the people in times of trouble. Therefore, he recommends that a prince make the people dependent on him and on the state so that their loyalty will have a stronger obligation during troubled times. 

“It is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they receive.” 

In Chapter 10, Machiavelli considers the way in which the strength of principalities should be measured. He points out that when a state comes under attack, a popular prince who has prepared well with arms and provisions can remain in power despite the fact that the state and the people’s possessions have been destroyed. This is because a sense of unity will take place, with the people now knowing that the prince is obligated to them as much as they are to him. 

“The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skillful, you are ruined in the usual way.” 

Machiavelli refers to a quandary concerning the use of mercenaries. He argues that resting hope on mercenaries will lead to ruin in one of two ways. If the mercenary is skillful, he will attempt to overthrow the prince himself, but if the mercenary is not skillful, ruin will come because of his cowardice.

“No principality is secure without having its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the valor which in adversity would defend it. And it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength.”

Having already discussed the use of mercenary troops, Machiavelli next discusses the use of auxiliary troops. He matter-of-factly argues against both types of defense and stresses the point that no state is truly secure unless it has its own troops, because otherwise a prince is left to depend on good fortune or the arms of others. Even when a prince has conquered and achieved power, he is always unstable if he does not have his own army made up of his own citizens. 

“A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank.” 

In Chapter 14, Machiavelli explores the importance of the art of war to a prince. According to Machiavelli, princes who have thought more of ease than of arms have lost their states. Becoming a master of the art of war enables a prince to rise to power and to maintain it, and it also enables the common man to rise to the position of a prince. 

“Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.” 

Concerning the way in which a prince should behave toward his subjects and allies, Machiavelli makes the controversial argument that princes who act with virtue at all times will come to ruin. His argument is based on a realistic view of human nature. Because men do not behave the way they should, a prince must be ready and able to behave improperly as well. 

“We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have been considered mean; the rest have failed.” 

In Chapter 16, Machiavelli examines liberality and meanness, or generosity and cruelty, in princes. His opinion is that cruelty may seem like a vice and liberality may seem like a virtue, but that is not always the case. Excessive generosity can easily turn into a vice because it will likely lead to increased taxes and injuries to more people. On the other hand, rulers who have had a reputation for cruelty have frequently done great things and achieved glory. 

“A prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women.” 

One of the more controversial aspects of Machiavelli’s work is his conclusion that is better for a ruler to be feared than loved. However, he stresses that the ruler should inspire fear in such a way that he avoids hatred. If the people hate the prince, he will be ruined, but if they fear him, they will obey him. As long as the ruler’s reputation for cruelty does not morph into him taking property from his subjects, he will avoid hatred while continuing to be feared. 

“Our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word.” 

In one of the most cynical and controversial chapters of The Prince, Machiavelli argues that the greatest rulers have known how to deceive the people, while rulers who have been truthful and kept their word have failed. In Machiavelli’s opinion, a ruler must appear to be truthful and operate with integrity, but in reality he should not operate that way. The most successful princes use craft and cunning to deceive the people. 

“Princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by everyone, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavor with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful.” 

Chapter 19 examines why and how princes should avoid being hated and despised. It is only natural that a prince cannot make everyone happy and will inevitably be hated by some, but it is extremely important for his survival that he not become hated by all. When all of the people are against the prince, he must work hard to secure the support of the nobles in order to survive. 

“The best possible fortress is—not to be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you.” 

In answering the question of whether the use of fortresses are advantageous or harmful to a prince, Machiavelli determines that princes who fear his people more than foreign invaders should use them, but those princes who fear foreigners more should not. In either one of those scenarios, the prince is hated by the people, resulting either in their taking up arms against the prince or welcoming foreign invaders to overthrow the prince. Therefore, the obvious best policy is simply to avoid the hatred of the people. 

“A prince ought, above all things, always endeavor in every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.”

Using Ferdinand of Aragon and Messer Bernabò da Milano as examples, Machiavelli explains what princes should do in order to gain renown. Ferdinand undertook many great military enterprises to win fame and glory. Messer Bernabò da Milano, the ruler of Milan, was renowned for setting unusual examples concerning internal affairs, frequently making a spectacle out of both rewarding and punishing citizens for extraordinary things. 

“It is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm against the tempest.”

Chapter 24 explores the reasons why the princes of Italy lost their states. Machiavelli names two major reasons—military organization and the hostility of the people—but he also sees complacency as an overarching factor. He argues that princes who lost their states cannot blame fortune or bad luck, but rather their own sloth because they did not prepare for trouble during times of peace. He sees this as a common defect in man, relating to the theme of human nature.