Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

“A metaphysics of morals is thus indispensably necessary, not merely on the grounds of speculation, for investigating the source of the practical principles that lie a priori in our reason, but because morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as we lack that guideline and supreme norm by which to judge them correctly.”

Kant argues that a metaphysics of morals prevents corruption. Establishing one will be of practical significance. This allows the reader to see how Kant’s ideas could function in everyday life.

“The present groundwork, however, is nothing more than the identification and corroboration of the supreme principle of morality, which by itself constitutes a business that is complete in its purpose and to be separated from every other moral investigation.”

This quote comes after Kant admits he will be unable to prove a metaphysics of morals in this work. However, by proving the presence of the supreme principle of morality, he will be able to pursue this in the future. The presence of this principle could also inspire other philosophers to continue Kant’s work.

“A good will is good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e. in itself; and, considered by itself, it is to be esteemed beyond compare much higher than anything that could ever be brought about by it in favor of some inclination, and indeed, if you will, the sum of all inclinations.”

This is our first glimpse of the idea that something can be an end in itself. In this case, a good will is good for its own sake. The logic in this quote lays the foundation for much of Kant’s future inquiry.

“[T]hese judgments are covertly founded on the idea of another and far worthier purpose of their existence, to which, and not to happiness, reason is quite properly destined, and to which, as its supreme condition, the private purpose of a human being must therefore largely take second place.”

This quote explains the battle between a human’s instinct to pursue happiness and their capacity to reason. Ideally, reason should supersede private concerns, such as happiness. This idea will prove to be important in Kant’s discussion of how people can be incentivized to follow universal law.

“It is just there that the worth of character commences, which is moral and beyond all comparison the highest, namely that he be beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty.”

Kant states the most moral action is one done out of pure duty. While we may have instincts to follow duty for selfish means (such as his hypothetical shopkeeper), it is important to note that duty is worth following for its own sake.

“[C]an you also will that your maxim become a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of some disadvantage to you, or to others, that might result, but because it cannot fit as a principle into a possible universal legislation, for which reason extracts from me immediate respect; and although I do not yet see on what it is founded (which the philosopher may investigate), at least I do understand this much [...] it is the condition of a will good in itself, whose worth surpasses everything.”

Kant argues that universalized maxims hold because we can understand them a priori. If someone does not understand the specific reasons something is legitimized, they can at least have the a priori knowledge its universality means it is good in itself. This demonstrates why a priori cognition is important in understanding moral laws.

“Moreover, one could not give morality worse counsel than by seeking to borrow it from examples.”

Kant cautions the reader against using personal experience to underscore morality. The subjectivity of human experiences prevents them from being universalized. Therefore, trying to use examples to underscore morality is contradictory and fundamentally impossible.

“But whence do we have the concept of God, as the highest good? Solely from the idea that reason a priori devises of moral perfection, and connects inseparably with the concept of a free will.”

Kant uses God as proof that a priori cognition is possible. We have an idea of God’s goodness despite never directly encountering him. This example may have been considered controversial to religious readers.

“Because every practical law represents a possible action as good and hence, for a subject practically determinable by reason, as necessary, all imperatives are formulae for the determination of an action necessary according to a principle of a will that is good in some way.”

Since practical laws represent good, reasonable actions, any imperative shows how to attain a specific end. It is necessary to note that “good” is not used here in a moral capacity—when he describes the hypothetical imperative later in the paragraph, he says it is good to reach a specific end. Therefore, he is referring to an imperative’s fitness to bring about an end.

“There is therefore only a single categorical imperative, and it is this: act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law [...] the universal imperative of duty could also be expressed as follows: so act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.”

Kant argues the categorical imperative dictates we treat our individual maxims as universal laws. This can also be understood as an expression of the Biblical Golden Rule, which commands we “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” While his Enlightenment audience may have been more secular, this connection to the Golden Rule would have likely been apparent.

“[I]t still proves that we actually acknowledge the validity of the categorical imperative, and permit ourselves (with all respect for it) just a few exceptions that, as it seems to us, are immaterial and wrenched from us.”

Kant suggests we understand the existence of the categorical imperative a priori because we know to try and exempt ourselves from its rules. This is an effect of reason succumbing to the instinct of self-preservation.

“[A] human being and generally every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means for the discretionary use for this or that will, but must in all actions, whether directed towards itself or also to other rational beings, always be considered at the same time an end.”

Here, Kant is saying humans have innate worth just by existing. Therefore, any moral action acknowledges them as such. This allows Kant to draw a parallel between humanity and morality.

“The practical imperative will thus be the following: So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”

Kant is expanding on the logic he presents in the previous quote. If an individual human is an end in themselves and hopes to be treated as such, they should treat others in the same way.

“[F]rom this now follows a third practical principle of the will, as the supreme condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will. According to this principle, all maxims are rejected that are not consistent with the will’s own universal legislation.”

If the categorical imperative commands we universalize our maxims, it suggests our own wills should be universally legislating. It is important to note Kant’s mention of “harmony with universal practical reason,” as the bulk of the Third Section is dedicated to establishing a connection between freedom, reason, and morality.

“The concept of every rational being that must consider itself as universally legislating through all the maxims of its will, so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view, leads to a very fruitful concept attached to it, namely that of a kingdom of ends. [...] Now, since laws determine ends according to their universal validity, it is possible—if one abstracts from the personal differences among rational beings, and likewise from all content of their private ends—to conceive a whole of all ends [...] in systematic connection, i.e., a kingdom of ends, which is possible according to the above principles.”

The presence of a kingdom of ends suggests once a person understands individual morality they can bring it to a community. The kingdom of ends implies morality can be used to collectively pursue ends in themselves.

“Morality thus consists in referring all action to the legislation by which alone a kingdom of ends is possible.”

Kant expands the idea of universally applicable morality. If an individual following the categorical imperative commits to act as though their maxims were universal, it follows these maxims could also apply to a broader community. Morality thus becomes a communal project.

“A will is absolutely good that cannot be evil, hence whose maxim, if made a universal law, can never conflict with itself.”

Here, Kant explains how moral maxims can never contradict themselves. If a will is universal, then it is always unequivocally good and therefore has no room to accommodate evil. This idea is apparent in several thought experiments Kant poses throughout the text (i.e., suicide negating nature by encouraging its destruction).

“Morality is thus the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to the possible universal legislation through its maxims.”

Kant states that morality connects our actions to our autonomous will. This establishes the connection between morality and freedom, which is something Kant hopes to prove later on.

“The principle of autonomy is thus: not to choose in any other way than the maxims of one’s choice are also comprised as universal law in the same willing.”

Kant explains that autonomy is to choose maxims that are universal laws. It may seem curious he defines autonomy based on something we should not choose, but this lays the foundation for his argument about how his system of morality can encourage our inherent freedom.

“For since morality serves as a law for us only as for rational beings, it must hold for all rational beings as well, and it must be derived solely from the property of freedom, freedom must also be proved as a property of the will of all rational beings; and it is not enough to establish it from certain supposed experiences of human nature.”

Since we seek to apply morality to rational beings and rational beings are free, our wills should also be free. This proves freedom is an inherent characteristic of the will and not something gained from experience.

“For now we see that, when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves as members into the world of understanding, and cognize autonomy of the will along with its consequence, morality; but if we think of ourselves as bound by duty we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the world of understanding.”

Kant explains why his seemingly restrictive theory of morality can actually encourage freedom. If we enter the world of understanding and know that our will is autonomous, we can spend less time worrying about whether our actions are moral.

“And thus categorical imperatives are possible, because the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in virtue of which, if I were that alone, all my actions would always conform with the autonomy of the will, but as at the same time I intuit myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought to conform with it [...]”

Categorical imperatives are possible based on the human ability to perceive an intelligible world and a sensible world. In the intelligible world, our actions automatically support the will’s autonomy, and in the sensible world we can understand why our actions should support the will’s autonomy. This idea suggests we are capable of complex reasoning.

“But reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain how pure reason can be practical, which would be one and the same task entirely as to explain how freedom is possible.”

Since Kant intended for Groundwork to act as the foundation for future works, it makes sense he would take a moment to acknowledge the limitations of his theories. Here, he suggests reason would defy its natural characteristics if it sought to explain itself.