The Federalist Papers

“Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers.”

Throughout these essays, Jay and his coauthors attempt to negotiate a balance between an energetic and empowered government and the rights of the people governed. On one hand, the government must be powerful enough to provide for the safety of its citizens, which necessarily requires that citizens subordinate some of their natural rights to the rule of law. In this, The Federalist Papers and the Constitution itself bear the influence of Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke, who believed that people willingly transfer some of their freedoms to sovereign authorities in exchange for the protection of other rights.

“To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.”

An important feature of The Federalist Papers and the US Constitution it defends is the assumption that individuals who seek to govern others are susceptible to the worst qualities of human nature. This premise justifies the extensive checks and balances that prevent one individual or one group of individuals from usurping a measure of power that would conflict with the goals of good republican governance. Throughout the essays, the authors balance this assumption against a concurrent belief in the people’s capacity for goodness, so long as the government is built to incentivize Americans’ better angels.

“The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors.”

Although Hamilton believes that a strong standing army during peacetime is an important deterrence to invading armies and domestic insurrection, he is also sensitive to the threat of tyranny and oppression it poses. The ample space the authors devote to the issue of standing armies in these essays reflects one of the dominant political anxieties of late 18th-century America. These anxieties were rooted in the oppressive treatment of British soldiers toward colonists prior to the American Revolution, and they were directly responsible for the inclusion of the Third Amendment to the US Constitution, which prohibits the forced quartering of soldiers in private homes during peacetime.

“But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.”

For Madison, the greatest concern in a democracy is the emergence of rival factions which, at best, paralyze the government and, at worst, tear it down. The genius of the Constitution, in his mind, is that it gives the people a strong voice in their own government while safeguarding against scenarios in which conflicting interests lead to paralysis or bloodshed. Furthermore, Madison openly names wealth inequality as the chief driver of these tensions, an argument supported by the previous year’s outbreak of Shays’ Rebellion, an armed uprising against economic injustice.

“A nation cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province.”

Hamilton’s focus on the importance of federal revenue is among the most important components of his legacy. As the nation’s first Security of the Treasury, he established the first national bank which was designed to stabilize the nation’s credit. The revenues are crucial for two reasons: First, they allow the country to raise an army and navy without relying on loans from foreign nations who may later become adversaries. Second, they allow the country to pay off debts to its own citizens, which it had amassed during the American Revolution. Given the centrality of this issue in Shays’ Rebellion, resolving these debts would go a long way in reducing the possibility of violent insurrection.

“No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies.”

Madison and Hamilton often alternate between condemnations of human nature and exultations of the American spirit. Though human beings may be “ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious” as Hamilton points out in Federalist No. 6, the authors also trust the American people to rise to the occasion and fulfill the promise of a new union under the US Constitution. For Madison, it would be a great shame to watch Americans, after dying for one another’s liberties during the American Revolution, to then turn against each other as citizens of separately governed states.

“But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?”

To Madison, the novelty of the Constitution is a feature, not a disadvantage. The colonies were founded by individuals who resisted the religious restrictions and titles of nobility in Great Britain in favor of building a new society built on Enlightenment ideals. As in the previous quote, Madison laments that the boldness with which the country rebelled against Great Britain is now absent when it is time to form a government of its own.

“Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”

Hamilton returns to the notion that human beings, absent the constraints of government, will devolve into a violent state of chaos reminiscent of philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s vision of the lives of the ungoverned as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” He does this to highlight the anarchy which he believes will prevail if the nation continues under the government of the Articles of Confederation. His key point is that if the objective of government is to constrain the passions of the people and thus better ensure liberty and prosperity, then the most expedient form of government for that purpose is the one proposed by the Constitution, not the loose confederation currently in place.

“The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York.”

Though rarely mentioned by name, Shays’ Rebellion casts a long shadow over efforts to replace the Articles of Confederation with a new government under the Constitution. While some may argue that frequent references to unrest in Massachusetts qualify as scare tactics, the threat of violent insurrection was very real in a country that insisted on collecting taxes from citizens despite refusing to pay what was owed to veterans of the American Revolution. That said, Hamilton may overstep by inciting fears that an American version of Julius Caesar or Oliver Cromwell is poised to command a complete overthrow of state and federal governments if the Constitution is not ratified.

“When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods.”

In Hamilton’s mind, supermajorities—meaning, majorities comprised of well over 50 percent of the whole—are a danger to republican government. This is consistent with the author’s broader belief that government bodies must be imbued with sufficient “energy” to pass and administer laws for the good of the people, and that it is better to err on the side of action than paralysis. This debate has recently reemerged as a major focal point in US national politics, as a Democratic-controlled Senate weighs the elimination of the filibuster, which in practice requires a 60-vote Senate majority to pass many types of legislation.

“It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect.”

For all of the founders’ wisdom, both Hamilton and Madison belabor the point that the Constitution, as presently formulated, is far from perfect. Despite the Constitution’s hallowed position in many Americans’ minds as a founding document unequaled in its elegance, its framers were keenly aware of its imperfections. The zeal with which they argue for its ratification is rooted less in the singular genius of the document and more in the authors’ contention that America, under the Articles of Confederation, is teetering on the brink of insolvency, anarchy, and usurpation.

“It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy.”

This is among the vanishingly small number of references to slavery in The Federalist Papers—this, despite the fact that slavery was a significant point of contention at the Constitutional Convention. Here, Madison betrays the deeply contradictory nature of his views on slavery. Although Madison is quick to condemn the “barbarism” of the slave trade, as a member of the Virginia planter elite he owned over one hundred enslaved people. Moreover, despite his stated belief that slavery was incompatible with the principles of republican government, Madison’s political and personal life show him failing to live up to these beliefs. For example, he did little as President or in any other official capacity to significantly curtail slavery, and in the 1830s Madison sold many of his enslaved people to escape financial ruin.

“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”

Madison puts forth one of the clearest expressions of why the separation of powers is so important. This maxim concerning the separation of powers is a dominant guiding principles behind the Constitution and, by extension, The Federalist Papers which defend it. Tellingly, Madison cites this as an existential danger regardless of the form of government, whether it be a monarchy, a republic, or a pure democracy.

“You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.”

Equally important as the separation of powers are the checks and balances the Constitution places between each branch of government. According to Madison, powers must be separated, but not to such an extent that each branch is allowed unchallenged control over its specific domain. For example, the legislative branch is responsible for impeachment, despite the fact that this is a judicial act. In turn, the executive branch makes treaties, even though a treaty is essentially a law, albeit one between two sovereign nations.

“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”

This quote progresses from the dual premise than neither government nor humanity is perfect. Moreover, there can be no perfection in government because it is an apparatus populated by imperfect individuals. The best the framers can do is draft a document that anticipates the worst of human nature, while allowing the best of human nature to shine through.

“Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN.”

Here, Madison comes to the defense of the ugliest and most notorious passage of the US Constitution: the three-fifths compromise. In short, the Southern planter elite argued that enslaved people should count toward each state’s population for the purpose of apportioning House representation, despite the fact that these men, women, and children were not treated as human beings under the law. The convention’s Northern delegates compromised by deigning that enslaved people would retain three-fifths of their humanity for the purpose of counting populations in the Southern states while remaining little more than property in the eyes of the law. Few statutes could be considered more inimical to the tenets of the Declaration of Independence as written and republican government more generally than this deprivation of human rights and enshrinement of slavery in the nation’s founding document. Moreover, this reveals the extent to which the Constitution is a document of political expediency, rather than a pure expression of republican values.

“This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.”

Consistent with Hamilton’s focus on state and federal finances, Madison identifies Congress’s budgetary power as a crucial check against executive overreach. This is among numerous qualities the US Constitution borrows from Great Britain, where Parliament’s budgetary discretion prevents the monarch from exercising absolute power. Congress’s “power over the purse” is also one of the more durable components of the Constitution, as it continues to serve as a significant roadblock for Presidents looking to enact ambitious domestic policy agendas in the 21st century.

“EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION.”

This is an overwhelmingly clear expression of Hamilton’s political philosophy concerning the federal government. Although he is willing to grant the states a wide array of powers not explicitly outlined in the US Constitution, any statute that allows a state to threaten the existence or curtail the duties of the federal government is anathema to Hamilton. In this case, the passage concerns the federal government’s ultimate authority in matters of federal elections, even as it grants states the right to administer these elections under normal situations.

“And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles.”

In an essay on how members of Congress are elected, Hamilton makes an argument that is incredibly relevant in the 21st century. In 2021, numerous state legislatures have proposed laws that would restrict voting access for certain communities, particularly communities of color. Although proponents of these laws argue that they do not put an undue burden on voters, they fail to consider Hamilton’s contention that what some may view as a mere inconvenience may represent a significant assault on voting rights.

“The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.”

This is yet another quote that holds significant relevance to the United States centuries later. Concerning impeachment, Hamilton points out the violations committed by the President that would justify their removal need not be criminal in nature. Given that they are violations of the public trust, they are inherently political in nature. This is why he is comfortable empowering the legislative branch with impeachment, despite the fact that impeachment is a fundamentally judicial act.

“The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever.”

Of all of the authors’ predictions of how the Constitution would be implemented in practice, few are more off-base than those concerning the judiciary. Under Hamilton’s interpretation, citizens need not worry about the investment of undue power in the federal judiciary because it is designed to be a passive body that merely makes judgments on the more active roles of the legislative and executive branches. However, many individuals from across the modern American political spectrum believe that the federal judiciary—specifically, the Supreme Court—has grown into an enormously formidable group capable of exercising significant power in its rulings.

“Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of particular reservations. "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Here is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.”

Hamilton goes to great lengths in arguing that the US Constitution does not need a bill of rights. By carefully proscribing the powers available to the federal government, he argues, the Constitution preserves concepts like the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion tacitly. Critics, however, point to an anti-egalitarian streak in Hamilton that may have played a role in his antipathy toward including a bill of rights.

“These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE.”

Once again, Hamilton cautions against those who demand perfection from the Constitution, under the maxim that perfection is the enemy of progress. He paints an exceptionally bleak picture of the country’s near-future under the Articles of Confederation, summoning frightening images of the American carnage that will ensue if the Constitution is not ratified. Moreover, he gestures at the mutability of the document, pointing out that “TIME and EXPERIENCE” under the Constitution will give citizens the wisdom to continue shaping the document so it better resembles the perfection they crave.