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96 pages 3 hours read

Walter Isaacson

The Code Breaker: Jennifer Doudna, Gene Editing, and the Future of the Human Race

Nonfiction | Biography | Adult | Published in 2021

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Chapters 48-52Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 48 Summary: “Call to Arms”

Circling back to the March 13, 2020, meeting mentioned in Chapter 1, Doudna’s team and other Bay area colleagues readied themselves to face an unprecedented challenge: the coronavirus pandemic. The meeting included colleagues from the Innovative Genomic Institute (IGI), a joint research partnership between Berkeley and the University of California, San Francisco.

SARS-CoV-2, or COVID-19, is deceptively simple. The simplicity helps viruses wriggle into organisms and hijack their machinery to replicate. In the case of COVID-19, the genetic material is RNA, Doudna’s specialty. One of the virus’s 29 proteins sits atop the virus shell like a spike, giving it its characteristic crown or corona-like appearance. The spike also acts as a key that latches easily into the ACE2 protein found in human cells. However, unlike the CCR5 protein in the case of HIV, ACE2 is a useful protein and cannot be eliminated from the human body. With the complete sequence of the COVID-19 available by early 2020, molecular biologists around the world began to research treatments that would stop the virus from latching onto human cells.

Berkeley decided to make IGI’s research on coronaviruses freely available to other researchers. Though the university would still file a patent for the IP, the work itself could be licensed for free. Doudna drew up a list of 10 projects, the first of which focused on the most urgent task of developing diagnostic tests for the virus.

Chapter 49 Summary: “Testing”

When the coronavirus was declared a public health emergency in the United States on January 31, 2020, it meant the FDA could speed up the review of diagnostic tests. However, this had a strange unintended consequence. In a public health emergency, universities and research labs cannot use the tests they have devised unless they seek emergency use authorization. As it turned out, getting public use authorization would be a slow, painful process. Worse, the first batch of the CDC’s tests, which received FDA approval in February, did not work properly.

In a typical coronavirus test, RNA, if present, is extracted from a patient’s mucus—collected through a long swab—and then reverse transcribed into DNA. This DNA is amplified into a million strands using a polymerase chain reaction (PCR), making it easy to spot. When the CDC’s first batch of tests proved faulty, the University of Washington stepped in. Alex Greninger, an assistant director of virology at the university, had already been working on a diagnostic test. By February, he had a working test ready, but getting authorization for the test proved tricky.

However, Anthony Fauci, the head of infectious diseases at the National Institutes of Health, stepped in and urged the FDA to hasten approvals to universities. Rapid testing was the absolute need of the hour. On February 29, the FDA allowed university labs to begin testing while they awaited authorization. Within a few weeks, Greninger was testing 2,500 samples a day. Meanwhile, Eric Lander, always eager to deploy science in public interest, sanctioned a testing lab on the premises of the Broad Institute.

Chapter 50 Summary: “The Berkeley Lab”

Doudna and her colleagues brainstormed whether they should use the trusted (but slow) PCR method or invent a new tech based on CRISPR. The urgency of the pandemic mandated that they go ahead with both, focusing especially on the PCR method. To command the operation, Doudna chose Moscow-born Fyodor Urnov, who had led her lab’s efforts in devising a treatment for sickle-cell anemia. A quasi-renaissance man, Urnov was also interested in both entrepreneurship and literature. Urnov was joined by postdoc researcher Enrique Lin Shiao and Jennifer Hamilton, who had taught Isaacson how to use CRISPR in a human cell.

The team scrambled for equipment from the now-deserted campus. Spending over half a million dollars on supplies, Urnov, Hamilton, and Lin Shiao procured a contraption called the Hamilton STARlet. Robotic pipettes extract small amounts from patient samples, place them onto plates the size of iPhones with 96 wells, and load the plates into the machine’s chamber, where each sample is doused with reagents to extract the RNA. The machine issues a barcode to each sample to eliminate mixing and errors. Since federal permissions were still unclear and private labs were taking a week to return tests, there was a huge demand for Berkeley’s testing, especially for the poor and homeless. On April 6, 2020, the first batch of tests was delivered to quarantined firefighters.

Chapter 51 Summary: “Mammoth and Sherlock”

At IGI’s March 13, 2020, meeting, Urnov raised a pertinent issue: If bacteria can use CRISPR to detect attacking viruses, can CRISR be made to detect coronavirus RNA in human cells?

Two groups had already presented papers outlining a viable CRISPR method for COVID-19 diagnosis. One was associated with Mammoth Biosciences, which had Doudna on its board of scientific advisors. Mammoth was founded by Doudna’s doctoral students Janice Chen and Lucas Harrington. In Doudna’s lab, Chen and Harrington had discovered the that Cas12a enzyme could also be engineered to target and cut DNA. However, Cas12a didn’t just stop there; it went into a cutting frenzy, slicing any single-strand DNA available. Doudna’s husband Jamie Cate suggested that this property could be harnessed into a diagnostic tool. So, Chen and Harrington combined Cas12a with a “reporter molecule,” which was a fluorescent signal connected to a bit of DNA. When Cas12a found a targeted sequence of DNA, it also attacked the reporter molecule. The glowing signal from the chopping indicated that the enzyme had found its targeted sequence, which could be a virus, a bacteria, or even cancer cells. This system was dubbed DETECTR.

The other group was affiliated with Sherlock Biosciences, founded by Zhang and two of his protégés, Omar Abudayyeh and Jonathan Gootenberg. Zhang’s proposed detection system—with the acronym SHERLOCK—was based on the newly detected Cas13 enzyme, which behaved much like Cas12a, but with RNA. In his work with Cas13, Zhang speculated that it was an evolutionary method to have the infected cell commit suicide: The cell cut up its own RNA and died to prevent the infection from spreading.

Though Mammoth and Sherlock released their papers around the same time, there was much less wrangling over patents this time round. With the coronavirus crisis looming, both Doudna and Zhang knew it was imperative to reprogram their diagnostic tools to detect coronavirus infections.

Chapter 52 Summary: “Coronavirus Tests”

In January 2020, Zhang began getting calls for help about the coronavirus from Chinese academics and even the Chinese consulate in New York. Zhang decided to reconfigure his SHERLOCK tool to test for COVID-19. Since he did not have access to real COVID-19 samples so early on, Zhang used the system on a synthetic version. With Abudayyeh and Gootenberg’s help, he soon devised a simple method that could deliver results in an hour. All it required was a small device that kept a constant temperature as it amplified the virus’s genetic material. By February 14, Zhang’s lab had posted a white paper on the process—called STOP, short for SHERLOCK Testing in One Pot—and invited any lab to use the process freely. Meanwhile, Sherlock Biosciences began making COVID-19 test kits based on Zhang’s method. By late 2020, the company was working with manufacturers to develop small machines that could give results in less than an hour.

Around the same time, Chen and Harrington were also approached to develop a test by a board member of Mammoth Biosciences. Because of Mammoth’s ties with IGI, Chen and Harrington could access resources at the University of San Francisco’s hospital. Thus, they could test their DETECTR-based tool on real COVID-19 samples, unlike Zhang. Further, the Mammoth test relied on the Cas12a enzyme, which targets DNA. Theoretically, this should have been made it less efficient than Sherlock, which uses RNA-destroying Cas13. However, both tests required RNA to be converted to DNA to be amplified. SHERLOCK further had to convert this amplified DNA into RNA to be detected, adding an extra step.

Chapters 48-52 Analysis

One of the striking themes in this section is the difference in the government and the scientific community’s responses to the coronavirus crisis. In delineating the government’s response, Isaacson examines a new motif in the text: bureaucratic inefficiency. To put things in context, the first official guideline on testing for the new coronavirus was given on January 15, 2020, by Stephen Lindstorm of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC had developed a test, which was not yet approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Until the FDA approved the test, doctors could send samples to the CDC. The very next day, a Seattle doctor sent in a sample from a man who had recently returned from Wuhan—and it tested positive. More testing was needed, but by February, the CDC’s first batch of tests proved faulty.

Meanwhile, universities needed to get emergency use authorization to launch their tests. However, as Greninger’s case showed, the application process had bizarre requirements like sending the application to the FDA on a CD (apart from email and a physical copy). Further, the FDA wanted Greninger to run trials on SARS and MERS samples to rule out false positives, except there were no such cases in the United States in 2020. The Mayo Clinic also encountered similar problems, as did Broad and Harvard. Thus, bureaucracy delayed the initial response to COVID-19. Isaacson’s subtle critique of the government is significant, since until this point he has favored state interventions in research institutes. While government investment in universities is beneficial, sometimes bureaucracy really slows things down.

While the government response was tepid, researchers responded to the crisis with far more alacrity. Significantly, scientists quickly rose to the occasion because they already had platforms ready. Indeed, as the coronavirus crisis unfolded, advances in science kept pace. This, more than anything else, supports Doudna’s argument against a moratorium on gene editing. Isaacson also suggests that the coronavirus crisis did something unexpected for the CRISPR crowd: it galvanized them to put patents and profits aside to focus on the community’s good.

Nowhere is this attitude more apparent than in the approach adopted by IGI under Doudna. For instance, by IGI’s second meeting on coronaviruses, Doudna had drawn up a list of 10 projects, which included developing a CRISPR-based diagnostic test and finding ways to deliver into the lungs a CRISPR-based system that could destroy the virus’s genetic material. However, a professor named Robert Tijan introduced a note of clarity, citing a “fire-on-my-ass problem.” Notably, they had to deal with the urgent need for public testing before turning to biotechnologies of the future. Therefore, the first team Doudna launched was charged with developing diagnostic tests for the virus. The focus shifted from science for science’s sake to science that helps people immediately. This was the science in action that Doudna had craved for so long. When Berkeley’s tests were finally delivered, Urnov saw a small note pasted outside their lab: “Thank you, IGI! Sincerely, the people of Berkeley and the World” (408).

Even the Doudna-Zhang rivalry evolved with the pandemic. While Isaacson returns to the Doudna-Zhang parallelism in Chapters 51 and 52, gone is the animosity that prevailed a decade ago. Both Doudna’s Mammoth and Zhang’s Sherlock were more focused on developing an early detection method for the coronavirus than winning patents. Crucially, CRISPR-based tests are faster than the PCR method and more efficient than antigen testing, which detects virus RNA only when the patient is highly infective. The ultimate goal for both Sherlock and Mammoth is to make these cheap, quick tests available for home use. But the applications don’t stop with COVID-19. CRISPR-based tests could potentially be adapted into home-testing kits for other viruses, cancer screening, nutritional analyses, and more. They have the power to bring biology into everyday lives the way the digital revolution brought tech into homes.

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