Justice as Fairness: A Restatement

Both property-owning democracy and liberal socialism posit a constitutional framework, democratic accountability, a fair distribution of political liberties, and the regulation of social inequality. Liberal socialism is democratic since power collectively belongs to the workers, rather than an elite bureaucracy supposedly acting in their interest (as in state socialism). Property-owning democracy sanctifies the right of personal property while actively preventing excessive concentrations of wealth and power. Welfare-state capitalism is closer to the principle of average utility described in Part 3, which could theoretically tolerate a monopoly of power so long as everyone else meets a basic minimum standard of living (95-96). Measures such as unemployment benefits or even a progressive tax system are insufficient to address the resultant inequalities of opportunity and self-respect that result. Both property-owning democracy and liberal socialism are theoretically capable of achieving justice, and so the choice between them will tend to hinge on historical and cultural considerations rather than the intrinsic worthiness of either. Ideally, both regimes will avoid having or creating an “underclass” (140), even if some measure of inequality is inevitable in each one.

Rawls revisits the versions of “the good” that a just society must agree on, even as it refrains from embracing a comprehensive moral doctrine. These goods include rationality as the organizing principle of society, directing it toward human fulfillment, as well as primary goods constituting the specific needs for citizens to live as free and equal. Next is the permissibility of all versions of the good consistent with public justice, as well as the ideal of civic virtue, the goodness of political participation and its likely overlap with private conceptions of the good. Finally, there is the value of basing a society on principles of justice. The ideal society will then be a group of groups, people with different interests and beliefs coming together to maximize the benefit of their own group through cooperation with others. This stands apart to more ancient or Renaissance-era notions of “classical republicanism or “civic humanism” which respectively place too much emphasis on the virtue of individuals over the benefits of society, or too much emphasis on the intrinsic worthiness of political association, with insufficient attention upon the worthiness of the individual.

Rawls then makes an additional distinction between constitutional and procedural democracy. A constitutional democracy enshrines basic rights and freedoms into a constitution that is ratified democratically but is then resistant to subsequent alteration. Procedural democracy operates on a consistent principle of majority rule, while making it possible for that majority to limit or even abolish the rights of minorities. Procedural democracy would presumably have wider latitude to act in the public interest and would have enough of a liberal attitude to refrain from majoritarian persecution, but Rawls prefers constitutional limits that ensure the universal protection of basic rights, in case the psychological barriers to majoritarianism prove insufficient.

Some (such as Karl Marx) might object that fixating on rights is an error, since formal rights are merely paper guarantees, while material life constitutes the real basis for rights. Rawls addresses this problem by defining “fair value,” which affirms the right of all citizens to participate in government. In the absence of such a guarantee, there is no clear way for citizens to affect policy short of a revolution. The precise way to ensure equal political opportunity is a question for each society to answer, but the basic principles are that all citizens have roughly equal access to public goods and that all have an equal chance of winning public honors through fair competition, so that those with greater means are not able to exclude those with less.

Assigning fair value to other rights, such as a basic income or access to healthcare, is either unnecessary (as the difference principle would supply the same outcome) or counterproductive, as it might heighten tensions among economic classes, as they will see themselves as fighting for a maximum share of social resources rather than finding stability in the assurance that the most advantaged will contribute to the benefit of the least advantaged. Rawls values the equality of opportunity as a basis for the social contract, rather than a promise of perfect outcomes, which will only provoke resentment when it goes unfulfilled. The allocation of specific goods runs too close to questions of deserving and departs from the fundamental questions of justice that ought to take priority.

The next question concerns the attitude that liberalism maintains toward competing versions of the good. Despite its putative neutrality, a liberal polity is very likely in practice to prove more amenable to certain viewpoints as opposed to others, particularly those that emphasize individual freedom and the equality of all reasonable moral viewpoints. A comprehensive liberalism might be intolerant of all contrary perspectives, even when they stay within the private sphere and do not challenge public principles of justice. Rawls concedes this point, not as a flaw of liberalism, but as an inevitable feature of all social life, which must always choose some viewpoints as more valued than others. Rawls believes that liberalism is best equipped to provide the most rational standard for evaluating its compatibility with different doctrines. For example, a liberal society must educate all children in its principles of justice, even when those children come from backgrounds such as a religious group that eschews all modern beliefs and practices. Rawls responds that an education in the art of citizenship is not the same as indoctrinating them into a particular set of values; such an education only informs them of both the rights they have regardless of their personal beliefs and the respect they are legally obligated to pay to others. It is a clarification of their situation as citizens and not the imposition of a moral requirement beyond what the laws themselves already enjoin.

Turning to economic institutions, Rawls objects to the idea of taxation based on talent (head taxes), on the grounds that it is impossible to quantify by any consistently fair standard. People will conceal their talents if they are going to be penalized for them. The basic principle of liberty must accept some measure of inequality and use inequality of talent to benefit those that are less advantaged rather than punish the more advantaged.

Rawls advises that a property-owning democracy establish a just percentage of savings from overall income based on what the present generation would have expected from previous generations to sacrifice on their behalf. He also suggests a tax on consumption rather than income as a more genuinely progressive way to ensure the wealthy pay their fair share. Such institutions are a way to secure over the long term what the difference principle secures in the short term.

Rawls then turns to the institution of the family, although he means only to emphasize that the family belongs within the overall framework of the basic structure, and not to specify how exactly principles of justice might affect family life. The family has a necessary place within a just society as the preferred method for raising children, although Rawls does not mandate any particular moral framework for the family. A society’s principles of justice do not pertain directly to the workings of the family, as in there is no need to ensure that young children have the same rights as adult parents. Rather, justice must affirm the integrity of the institution itself. Within a family, there may be discrepancies in power based on age or gender, and parents may even cast out their children because of some moral offense, so long as none of those behaviors intrude upon their rights as citizens. The one burden that society imposes upon parents is that they render their children fit for civic participation as much as possible. Even a patriarchal family must not inhibit their daughters from at least having the option to partake in their civil rights and liberties, regardless of whether or not they choose to live according to their parents’ values.

Rawls compares his own understanding of primary rights with the arguments of Amartya Sen, an economist and philosopher who argues that efforts to ensure social equality should emphasize personal capabilities rather than goods. Social goods are of no use to someone who lacks the social relations to employ them effectively. Rawls responds that the concept of primary goods bears an obvious connection to capabilities, such as freedom of conscience leading directly to participation in public life or a right to a fair income leading to material self-sufficiency. Sen might reply that the needs of various peoples are too diverse to support one overarching concept of primary goods, but gaining sufficient knowledge to accommodate these needs takes the conversation outside the bounds of the original position and is therefore a matter for legislative discussion rather than philosophic inquiry into the fundamental principles of justice. A society might in fact provide all the rights that Sen seeks, but a principle of justice must establish some kind of uniform standard before it can tend to the particulars.

Rawls then addresses Marx’s critique of liberalism, which is that any society which retains the institution of private property will ultimately result in massive inequalities of wealth and the immiseration of the poor, who are also the vast majority. Nothing short of total public ownership of property will suffice. Rawls critiques Marx on the grounds that a communist utopia simply assumes that the question of justice will no longer pertain, and Rawls finds this to be a refusal to engage with the realities of politics. Worker-managed firms could be a useful middle ground, although so far there is insufficient historical evidence to show how they might work.