History of the Peloponnesian War

“In investigating past history, and in forming the conclusions which I have formed, it must be admitted that one cannot rely on every detail which has come down to us by way of tradition. People are inclined to accept all stories of ancient times in an uncritical way—even when these stories concern their own native countries.” 

Here, Thucydides announces himself as skeptical of tradition and of stories from the distant past that cannot be corroborated or evidenced. In Thucydides’ time, people looked to the Olympian gods and the myths associated with them to explain human events and their outcomes. Throughout the book, Thucydides juxtaposes people’s reliance on sacrifices, oracles, and soothsayers with the consequences of human choices and errors and acts of nature, such as earthquakes, floods, and thunderstorms. In addition to questioning tradition, he questions his own leaders and seeks to assess them rationally and empirically.  

“It is better evidence than that of the poets, who exaggerate the importance of their themes, or of the prose chroniclers, who are less interested in telling the truth than in catching the attention of their public, whose authorities cannot be checked, and whose subject-matter, owing to the passage of time, is mostly lost in the unreliable streams of mythology. We may claim instead to have used only the plainest evidence and to have reached conclusions which are reasonably accurate, considering that we have been dealing with ancient history. As for this present war, even though people are apt to think that the war in which they are fighting is the greatest of all wars and, when it is over, to relapse again into their admiration of the past, nevertheless, if one looks at the facts themselves, one will see that this was the greatest war of all.”

In this passage, Thucydides discusses his objection to poets and writers: They are more interested in entertaining their audiences than in telling them the truth. This motif of language or rhetoric functioning outside of truth, which to Thucydides is tied to morality, repeats in later books when he reproduces speeches. At times, audience members object to speeches that sound good but do not have substance, or to speakers using their platforms to denounce their fellow citizens. Yet Thucydides himself claims to be reproducing speeches that he never heard or, if he did, reconstructs from memory and his own beliefs about what would have been appropriate to say, given the occasion. 

“And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at the events which I have described or else I heard them from eye-witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible. Not that even so the truth was easy to discover: different eye-witnesses gave different accounts of the same events, speaking out of partiality for one side or the other or else from imperfect memories.”

Contemporary historians would consider eyewitness accounts to be too biased to serve as reliable evidence. However, for Thucydides’ time, focusing on what has been seen and heard—and especially cross-referencing eyewitness accounts—represents a radical departure from traditional storytelling. Also radical is Thucydides acknowledging that personal interest and the fallibility of memory can pollute the quality of evidence. In one sense, he holds himself to this standard when he assesses both Athenian and Spartan leaders according to their behavior, rather than Thucydides’ own loyalties. Yet his questionable reporting of speeches may be said to fail his standards of truth.

“And it may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the needs of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever.” 

Scholars have made much of how complex and difficult Thucydides is to translate, which owes to his dense and wordy style. Translators have at times disagreed considerably over Thucydides’ meaning and whether it is even possible to translate him accurately. This passage sheds light on Thucydides’ own expressed intention for his idiosyncratic writing style: to serve accuracy and truth rather than entertainment. Victorian translator Richard Crawley famously rendered the last phrase—“done to last for ever”—as “a possession for all time” by (Book 1, Chapter 22). Ancient Greek poets claimed to bestow immortality on heroes by writing epic poems about them. Thucydides both appropriates and subverts this tradition, first by implying he is immortalizing the events of the Peloponnesian War “for ever” and second by immortalizing events that he can account for through his own and others’ first-hand experiences (48). For Thucydides, part of the value of immortalizing true events lies in their likelihood of repeating in the future. Thus, they are an education not only to contemporaries of these events but to all of humanity across time.

“The Spartans voted that the treaty had been broken and that war should be declared not so much because they were influenced by the speeches of their allies as because they were afraid of the further growth of Athenian power, seeing, as they did, that already the greater part of Hellas was under the control of Athens.” 

Thucydides differentiates between the essential truth that caused the Spartans and the Athenians to break their Thirty Years’ Peace and the “openly expressed” reasons (49). Both states expressed that they felt wronged by the other due to how they responded to their allies’ conflicts. Both felt deceived or disrespected by the other: Sparta, when Athens built its defensive walls after the Persian invasion; and Athens, when Sparta sent Athenian troops home following the slave rebellion. However, Thucydides boils down the reason for war to one factor: Sparta’s fear of Athens’ growing power. Power, especially as a corrupting influence, is a recurring motif in the book as Thucydides enumerates the many and various political maneuvers of both the two main powers and their constantly-shifting alliances. 

“So and such they were, these men—worthy of their city. We who remain behind may hope to be spared their fate, but must resolve to keep the same daring spirit against the foe. It is not simply a question of estimating the advantages in theory. I could tell you a long story (and you know it as well as I do) about what is to be gained by beating the enemy back. What I would prefer is that you should fix your eyes every day on the greatness of Athens as she really is, and should fall in love with her. When you realize her greatness, then reflect that what made her great was men with a spirit of adventure, men who knew their duty, men who were ashamed to fall below a certain standard. If they ever failed in an enterprise, they made up their minds that at any rate the city should not find their courage lacking to her, and they gave to her the best contribution that they could. They gave her their lives, to her and to all of us, and for their own selves they won praises that never grow old, the most splendid of sepulchres—not the sepulchre [sic] in which their bodies are laid, but where their glory remains eternal in men’s minds, always there on the right occasion to stir others to speech or to action. For famous men have the whole earth as their memorial: it is not only the inscriptions on their graves in their own country that mark them out; no, in foreign lands also, not in any visible form but in people’s hearts, their memory abides and grows. It is for you to try to be like them. Make up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and freedom depends on being courageous.” 

This passages is from Pericles’ Funeral Oration, one of the more famous speeches presented in the book. Ancient Greek tradition dictated that, following burial of the dead, a speaker be selected to address mourners. For the burial of the war’s first casualties, Pericles is chosen. Scholars have noted that the speeches Thucydides purports to reproduce at times seem to be in his voice. Pericles’ funeral oration provides a potential example of this. In Book 1, Thucydides expresses his desire to create a text that will “last for ever,” invoking the purpose of epic poetry (48). However, while myths lack a basis in empirical fact, Thucydides seeks to mythologize true events from his time (48). Pericles’s funeral oration similarly seeks to mythologize contemporary men. He describes “famous men” as being remembered “not by their physical graves but by the greatness of their deeds,” which remain “eternal in men’s minds” (149). Just as Pericles invokes their fathers’ sacrifices in the Persian War, future generations may invoke the men who have died in the current war. They become immortalized by their deeds, as were the Greeks’ mythic heroes.

In addition to the resonance with Thucydides’ stated intentions for his history (creating a lasting monument to greatness), Pericles’ words bring into relationship the part (individual soldiers) with the whole (the city of Athens). He honors the deeds and sacrifices of individuals while placing them in a larger context of protecting a city that serves, as Pericles says elsewhere in his oration, as an “education to Greece” (147). Later in the book, Thucydides will note that Athens was at its strongest under Pericles, who was more patriot than politician, unlike the city’s later leaders. 

“This, then, was the calamity which fell upon Athens, and the times were hard indeed, with men dying inside the city and the land outside being laid waste. At this time of distress people naturally recalled old oracles, and among them was a verse which the old men claimed had been delivered in the past and which said:

War with the Dorians comes, and a death will come at the same time.

There had been a controversy as to whether the world in this ancient verse was ‘dearth’ rather than ‘death’; but in the present state of affairs the view that the word was ‘death’ naturally prevailed; it was a case of people adapting their memories to suit their sufferings. Certainly I think that if there is ever another war with the Dorians after this one, and if a dearth results from it, then in all probability the people will quote the other version.” 

Here, Thucydides reflects on how the plague affected Athenians, in the process presenting a general truth about human nature: People tend to hear what they want to hear. This motif of meaning’s mutability recurs in Thucydides’ text, both with how people interpreted oracles and sacrifices (as occurs in this example) and with how they interpreted speeches (as occurs throughout the book). Regardless of how wise an argument, people often heard what they wanted to hear and followed their own whims and desires. Thucydides’ truth can also apply to scholarly translation debates: Translators see in him what they want or expect to see, and translate accordingly.

Thucydides also points out in this example how people looked to oracles as a way to understand events that befell them, rather than analyzing empirical facts to understand patterns of cause and effect.

“So revolutions broke out in city after city, and in places where the revolutions occurred late the knowledge of what had happened previously in other places caused still new extravagances of revolutionary zeal, expressed by an elaboration in the methods of seizing power and by unheard-of atrocities in revenge. To fit in with the change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character; ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action. Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot against an enemy behind his back was perfectly legitimate self-defense. Anyone who held violent opinions could always be trusted, and anyone who objected to them became suspect. To plot successfully was a sign of intelligence, but it was still cleverer to see that a plot was hatching. If one attempted to provide against having to do either, one was disrupting the unity of the party and acting out of fear of the opposition. In short, it was equally praiseworthy to get one’s blow in first against someone who was going to do wrong, and to denounce someone who had no intention of doing any wrong at all.”

This chapter follows Thucydides’ discussion of Corcyra, the first state where civil war occurred. He reflects on the corrosive effects of civil strife, which broke out throughout the Hellenic world during the war. As people divided themselves into warring groups, fanaticism became the norm, and this fanaticism infected every aspect of thought. When prudence, patience, and moderation are no longer valued, atrocities become inevitable. Both Athens’ destruction of Melos and the Syracusans’ annihilation of the Athenian expedition could be said, through Thucydides’ lens, to be the byproducts of this extremism. 

“Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils. To this must be added the violent fanaticism which came into play once the struggle had broken out. Leaders of parties in the cities had programmers which appeared admirable—on one side political equality for the masses, on the other the safe and sound government of aristocracy—but in professing to serve the public interest they were seeking to win the prizes for themselves. In their struggles for ascendancy nothing was barred; terrible indeed were the actions to which they committed themselves, and in taking revenge they went farther still. Here they were deterred neither by the claims of justice nor by the interests of the state; their one standard was the pleasure of their own party at that particular moment, and so either by means of condemning their enemies on an illegal vote or by violently usurping power over them, they were always ready to satisfy the hatred of the hour. Thus neither side had any use for conscientious motives; more interest was shown in those who could produce attractive arguments to justify some disgraceful action. [...]

As a result of these revolutions, there was a general deterioration of character throughout the Greek world. The simple way of looking at things, which is so much the mark of a noble nature, was regarded as a ridiculous quality and soon ceased to exist. Society had become divided into two ideologically hostile camps, and each side viewed the other with suspicion.” 

Thucydides further reflects on how the love of power corrupts character, both of individuals and societies as a whole. Fanaticism corrodes truth—expressed in the previous quote in his observation that words changed “their usual meanings” (243). This corrosion of truth, which began on an individual scale, then leads to an overall “deterioration of character,” as he believes happened “throughout the Greek world” as a result of civil strife (243). The final outcome of this struggle for power is destruction, as eventually happened to Athens. In laying out cause and effect in this way, Thucydides shows that conflict is the product of human actions and forces of nature rather than gods and myths.

“Next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, under the command of Agis, the son of Archidamus, the King of Sparta, set out to invade Attica and got as far as the Isthmus. Here, however, there were a number of earthquakes and they turned back again, so that no invasion took place. During this same period when earthquakes were happening so frequently, at Orobiae in Euboea the sea subsided from what was then the shore and afterwards swept up again in a huge wave, which covered part of the city and left some of it still under water when the wave retreated, so that what was once land is now sea. Those of the inhabitants who were unable to escape in time by running up to the high ground were lost in the flood. An inundation of the same kind took place at Atalanta, the island off the coast of Opuntian Locris; here part of the Athenian fortifications were swept away and one out of two ships that were drawn up on the beach was broken to pieces. At Peparethus, too, the sea sank back some distance from the shore, but this was not followed by an inundation; there was also an earthquake which destroyed part of the wall, the town hall, and a few other buildings. Events of this kind are caused, in my opinion, by earthquakes. Where the full force of the earthquake is felt, the sea is drawn away from the shore and then suddenly sweeps back again even more violently, thus causing the inundation. Without an earthquake I do not see how such things could happen.” 

Here,Thucydides describes in detail a natural disaster, again demonstrating his focus on the rational, empirical causes of events, in this case what contemporary readers would recognize as a tsunami. Thucydides’ analytical eye takes into account that, in additional to human choices, the natural world also impacts the outcome of events. King Agis’s invasion being stalled by an earthquake is one of many instances in the book when Thucydides accounts for forces of nature as causal agents. These forces exist in cause-and-effect relationships, rather than being the products of gods’ whims or soothsayers’ predictions.

“‘We, with the greatest reputation of any state in Hellas, have come here to you in order to ask for what previously we thought it was in our power to give. And this has not been caused by any decline in our power or by the kind of arrogance that proceeds from acquiring new power. Our resources are the same as ever; we simply miscalculated them, and this is a mistake that may be made by everyone. It is not reasonable, therefore, for you to think that because of your present strength and your recent acquisitions, fortune also will always be on your side. True wisdom is shown by those who make careful use of their advantages in the knowledge that things will change (and so too they will show more intelligence than others when things are going wrong with them); as for war, they will know that its course is governed by the total chances in operation and can never be restricted to the conditions that one or other of the two sides would like to see permanently fixed. Such people, by avoiding the over-confidence which may spring from a success in war, are less likely than anyone to make mistakes and are most anxious, if they can, to come to terms during the period of their own good fortune.

‘This, Athenians, is what you have the opportunity to do now with us, and so to avoid what may happen later, if you fail to agree with us and afterwards, as is quite possible, suffer a defeat. For then it would be thought that even your present successes were merely due to luck, whereas now you are in a position to leave behind you a safe and sure reputation both for strength and for wisdom.

‘Sparta calls upon you to make a treaty and to end the war. She offers you peace, alliance, friendly and neighborly relations.’” 

The Spartans’ first offer of peace to Athens occurs after Athens’ victories at Pylos, a territory in the Peloponnese. Athens was on its way to Sicily but has stopped in Pylos due to a storm—another instance of natural acts impacting human outcomes—and battled successfully against the Peloponnesians. This passage is the speech of a Spartan envoy to Athens, explaining why it is in Athens’ best interests to accept Sparta’s offer: Sparta’s defeat is not the product of arrogance, declining power, or a dearth of resources but simply mistakes, which Athens too may make at some point in the future. At the beginning of the book, Pericles warned Athens that he worried about mistakes they might make. The Spartan envoy echoes Pericles’ warning, but the Athenians do not heed it. They reject Sparta’s offer and ultimately suffer devastating defeat.

“Peace was then made, with the approval of the Athenian commanders, and afterwards the Athenian fleet sailed away from Sicily. However, when they arrived home the Athenians in Athens banished two of the generals, Pythodurus and Sophocles, and fined the third, Eurymedon, on the grounds that they had been bribed to leave Sicily when it was in their power to have taken control of the island. Such was the effect on the Athenians of their present good fortune that they thought that nothing could go wrong with them; that the possible and the difficult were alike attainable, whether the forces employed were large or wholly inadequate. It was their surprising success in most directions which caused this state of mind and suggested to them that their strength was equal with their hopes.”“Peace was then made, with the approval of the Athenian commanders, and afterwards the Athenian fleet sailed away from Sicily. However, when they arrived home the Athenians in Athens banished two of the generals, Pythodurus and Sophocles, and fined the third, Eurymedon, on the grounds that they had been bribed to leave Sicily when it was in their power to have taken control of the island. Such was the effect on the Athenians of their present good fortune that they thought that nothing could go wrong with them; that the possible and the difficult were alike attainable, whether the forces employed were large or wholly inadequate. It was their surprising success in most directions which caused this state of mind and suggested to them that their strength was equal with their hopes.”

The peace referred to in this passage is between Sicily and Athens, established in 424. Hermocrates of Syracuse presented a speech to the Sicilians, urging peace and reconciliation to protect the region from Athenian aggression. He cautioned the people that civil strife causes cities to decline (a point Thucydides makes repeatedly), and so it would be for Sicily if they did not come together. The people took Hermocrates’ advice and brokered peace, which they then offered to Athens. Though the Athenian commanders on the ground accepted the Sicilians’ peace offer, those in the city censure the decision since they seek to expand Athens’ empire. This was one of the mistakes Pericles warned them not to make; he cautioned them against expanding the empire while involved in the war with Sparta. Thucydides points out that Athens has come to trust something ephemeral—luck—rather than making rational decisions based on analysis of cause and effect.  

“On the next day the enemy were bringing up against them an engine from which they meant to throw down fire on the wooden part of the fortification; their troops were already drawing up close to the point where it seemed to them that the engine would be most effective and where the fortifications could most easily be stormed. To meet this threat the Athenians had erected a wooden tower on top of a house, and into this they carried a number of great jars and casks of water and large stones; a number of men also went up into the tower. But the weight was too heavy for the house to bear, and it suddenly collapsed with a loud crash. This caused more vexation than alarm among the Athenians who were close to the scene of action and saw what had happened, but those who were father off, and particularly those who were some distance away, thought that the fortifications had already been stormed at this point, and at once fell to the sea and their ships. Brasidas saw them leaving the parapet and realized what was happening. He charged forward with his army and took the place immediately, killing all those whom he found inside.

In this way the Athenians evacuated the position, and crossed over in their warships and transports to Pallene.” 

The event Thucydides describes here takes place during the Battle of Amphipolis. He devotes minute attention to the chain of events that leads the Athenians to evacuate Amphipolis. The description exemplifies his emphasis on how circumstance and human decision-making both play a role in outcomes. The circumstance is that the Peloponnesians are drawing dangerously close to the Athenians’ fortification. The Athenians make a decision to erect a tower, but its base is unstable, and it collapses. Soldiers who heard the sound assumed its cause was their fortifications being stormed and fled. Their response is an example of a mistake that could not necessarily be prevented, much as the Spartans, when they asked Athens to make peace after Pylos, warned could happen.  

“The arrangement and composition of the two armies were as above. The Spartan army looked the bigger, but it would be impossible for me to give the exact numbers either of the whole armies or of the various divisions on each side. The secrecy with which their affairs are conducted meant that no one knew the numbers of the Spartans, and for the rest it was impossible to rely on the estimates given, since it is human nature to boast about the size of one’s own forces. The following method of calculation, however, makes it possible to estimate the numbers of Spartans engaged on this occasion. Not counting the Sciritae, who were 600 in all, there were seven regiments fighting in the battle. In each regiment there were four companies, and in each company four platoons. Four men fought in the front rank of each platoon; in depth the arrangement was not the same throughout, but depended on the decision of the commanders of the regiments; on the whole, though, they were drawn up eight deep. The first rank, along the whole line, not counting the Sciritae, consisted of 448 men.” 

The armies Thucydides is counting were present for the Battle of Mantinea in 418-17. Thucydides describes how he calculates his numbers, emphasizing that his method is not derived from boasting or wishful thinking but from careful, meticulous assessment of available data. In this way, he attempts to show his credibility as a rational, empirical analyst.

“Then we on our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire because we defeated the Persians, or that we have come against you now because of the injuries you have done us—a great mass of words that nobody would believe. And we ask you on your side not to imagine that you will influence us by saying that you, though a colony of Sparta, have not joined Sparta in the war, or that you have never done us any harm. Instead we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” 

This passage appears in The Melian Dialogue and is one of its more debated and discussed passages in the text. The dialogue here conveys the words of the Athenian speaker, who informs the Melians that being the weaker power compels them to accept what a strong power (in this case, Athens) dictates. At the beginning of the dialogue, the Melians say they are being forced to choose between freedom and slavery; the Athenian does not necessarily dispute that. His point is that the powerful can do whatever they want, which speaks to the corrupting influence power can have. It can be used for good or ill, depending on human motivations and applications.

“The Athenians, however, far from losing their appetite for the voyage because of the difficulties in preparing for it, became more enthusiastic about it than ever, and just the opposite of what Nicias had imagined took place. His advice was regarded as excellent, and it was now thought that the expedition was an absolutely safe thing. There was a passion for the enterprise which affected everyone alike. The older men thought that they would either conquer the places against which they were sailing or, in any case, with such a large force, could come to no harm; the young had a longing for the sights and experiences of distance place, and were confident that they would return safely; the general masses and the average soldier himself saw the prospect of getting pay for the time being and of adding to the empire so as to secure permanent paid employment in future. The result of this excessive enthusiasm of the majority was that the few who actually were opposed to the expedition were afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted against it, and therefore kept quiet.” 

Nicias had intended to discourage Athens from embarking on the Sicilian expedition by elaborating on the great expense and preparation it would require. However, his words have the opposite effect: Rather than being discouraged, Athens is energized by the preparations involved. As Thucydides shows earlier with interpretations of oracles, people hear what they want to hear. Because they want to go on the expedition, they hear in an intended warning and opportunity to allow expedition preparations to animate them.

“When the ships were manned and everything had been taken aboard which they meant to take with them on the voyage, silence was commanded by the sounds of the trumpet, and the customary prayers made before putting to sea were offered up, not by each ship separately, but by them all together following the words of a herald. The whole army had wine poured out into bowls, and officers and men made their libations from cups of gold and of silver. The crowds on the shore also, the citizens and others who wished well to the expedition, joined together in the prayers. Then, when the hymn had been sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, first sailing out in column, and then racing each other as far as Aegina. So they made good speed on their way to Corcyra, where the other force of their allies was assembling.”

Here, Thucydides describes the expedition’s launch, capturing the pomp, grandeur, and especially optimism the military and citizens felt, from the trumpet and prayers to the column and racing. This passage is the final chapter of Book 6. Book 7 concerns the expedition’s failure. Thus Thucydides demonstrates both the harmful effects of overreaching pride and power and humans’ inability to see into the future. In these closing moments of Book 6, Thucydides demonstrates that the Athenians could scarcely have believed their grand expedition would be entirely annihilated within two years. 

“But what chiefly encouraged the Spartans to act with energy was their belief that Athens, with two wars on her hands—one against them and one against the Sicilians—would be now easier to crush. There was also the factor that the Spartans considered that Athens had been the first to break the peace treaty. In the first war they thought that the fault had been more on their side, partly because the Thebans had entered Plataea in peace time and partly because, in spite of the provision in the previous treaty that there should be no recourse to arms if arbitration were offered, they themselves had not accepted the Athenian offer of arbitration. They […] thought that there was some justice in the misfortunes they had suffered and took to heart the disaster of Pylos and their other defeats. But now, in addition to the constant raids from Pylos, the Athenians had come out with thirty ships from Argos and laid waste part of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places; also whenever any dispute arose on doubtful points in the treaty, it was Sparta who had offered to submit to arbitration and Athens now had refused the offer. It was now Athens therefore, the Spartans thought, who was in the wrong through having committed exactly the same fault as theirs had been before, and they went into the war with enthusiasm.” 

With Athens struggling in Sicily in 414-13, Sparta prepares to invade Attica, feeling the opportunity exists to defeat Athens while it is fighting on two fronts. Thucydides devotes considerable attention to exploring Sparta’s motives and reasoning not only for invading Attica but also for their enthusiasm to defeat Athens. Here, analyzing their motives and reasoning helps illuminate the decisions they made and the energy they brought to fighting. Feeling they had not done all they could to prevent war in 431 impacted Sparta’s frame of mind when facing defeats. However, their peace offer to Athens was rejected, and Athens has embarked on a quest against Sparta’s allies. Therefore, their mindset changes, and with it, their outcomes. Once again, Thucydides emphasizes how human actions and choices can impact outcomes.

“In the equipment of their fleet they made various changes, which, on the basis of their experience in the previous naval battle, were calculated to give them some advantages; in particular, they cut down the length of the prows to make them more solid, put extra material into the sides by the cat-heads, and from the cat-heads themselves they built in stays of timber which went through to the ships’ sides, a distance of about nine feet, and projected outwards to about the same distance. [...] The Syracusans thought that in this way they would have an advantage over the Athenian ships, which, instead of being constructed like theirs, were light in the prow, because […] the usual Athenian tactics were not to meet the enemy head on, but to row round and ram him amidships; and the fact that the battle would be in the great harbor [sic], where there would be many ships in a small space, was in their favor, since, charging prow to prow and striking with stout solid rams against hollow and weak ones, they would stave in the enemy’s foreships, while, in that narrow space, the Athenians would not be able to use their skill in manoeuvre [sic] on which their confidence was based; there could be no sailing round in circles and no breaking through the line and wheeling back again, as the Syracusans would do their best to prevent them breaking through the line, and lack of space would prevent them trying to manoeuvre [sic]. In fact this system of charging prow to prow, which previously had been regarded as a sign of lack of skill in the steersman, was now going to be the chief method employed by the Syracusans, since it would give them the greatest advantages.” 

This passage describes Syracuse’s new style of ships, to be employed in the Great Harbour battle of 413. Thucydides explains that the design was carefully considered and intended to compensate for disadvantages the Syracusans previously experienced against Athens. The Syracusans would go on to win this battle. Their ships would give them an advantage over Athens, as the Syracusans had planned. Noteworthy here is that Thucydides once again demonstrates both his rational approach in analyzing the minutia that allows Syracuse to win the battle and the benefits of a rational approach overall. Syracuse analyzed battle conditions and considered what kind of ships would function best within those conditions. This rational, empirical approach leads the Syracusans to victory.

“And Nicias, half-distraught by the present position, realizing how much was at stake and how imminent already the hazard, and thinking as men do think in moment of great crisis, that when everything has been done there is still something that needs doing, when everything has been said there is still something left unsaid, again called to him personally all the captains of triremes, man by man, addressing each by his father’s name and his own name and the name of his tribe. He entreated those who had an established and brilliant reputation not to betray that reputation now, and those whose ancestors were famous men not to deface the great deeds of their forbears; he reminded them of their country, the freest in the world, and of how all who lived there had liberty to live their own lives in their own way; and he said other things too—the things that men can be expected to say when they are actually on the edge of the event and do not bother to avoid giving the impression of using conventional language; instead they bring forward the kind of appeals that can generally be used on all occasions: wives, children, gods of the native land; yet still they cry out these names aloud, since, in the terror of the moment, they believe that they will help.

So these words of encouragement seemed to Nicias himself still to fall short of their mark and to be no more than barely adequate to the occasion.” 

Nicias here prepares for the 413 naval battle. The Syracusans will win, and the entire Athenian expedition will perish in a chaotic retreat. A sense of foreboding suffuses the passage, both in phrases like “half-distraught” and “great crisis” and in Nicias’ own realization that his words are insufficient. Interestingly, his words to his captains are not delivered in speech form but are summarized. Thus, Thucydides’ emphasis here is not on the words themselves but what they signified: the desperation of once-great Athens, which was brought low by its own arrogance and overreaching.

“Afterwards, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought that the preparations were complete, came the time for the army to move, two days after the naval battle. It was a terrible scene, and more than one element in their situation contributed to the dismay. Not only were they retreating after having lost all their ships, and instead of their high hopes now found themselves and the whole state of Athens in danger, but in the actual leaving of the camp there were sad sights for every eye, sad thoughts for every mind to feel. The dead were unburied, and when any man recognized one of his friends lying among them, he was filled with grief and fear; and the living who, whether sick or wounded, were being left behind caused more pain than did the dead to those who were left alive, and were more pitiable than the lost. Their prayers and their lamentations made the rest feel impotent and helpless, as they begged to be taken with them and cried aloud to every single friend or relative whom they could see; as they hung about the necks of those who had shared tents with them and were now going, following after them as far as they could, and, when their bodily strength failed them, reiterated their cries to heaven and their lamentations as they were left behind. So the whole army was filled with tears and in such distress of mind that they found it difficult to go away even from this land of their enemies when sufferings too great for tears had befallen them already and more still, they feared, awaited them in the dark future ahead. There was also a profound sense of shame and deep feelings of self-reproach. [...] And then there was the degradation of it all and the fact that all without exception were afflicted, so that, although there may be some lightening of a burden when it is shared with many others, this still did not make the burden seem any easier to bear at the time, especially when they remembered the splendor and the pride of their setting out and saw how mean and abject was the conclusion. No Hellenic army had ever suffered such a reverse. They had come to enslave others, and now they were going away frightened of being enslaved themselves; and instead of the prayers and paeans with which they had sailed out, the words to be heard now were directly contrary and boded evil as they started on their way back, sailors travelling on land, trusting in hoplites rather than in ships. Nevertheless, when they considered the greatness of the danger that still hung over them, all this seemed able to be borne.”

In one of the most emotional passages in his text, Thucydides describes the Athenian military’s fraught retreat. After losing the final naval battle, the soldiers attempt to retreat by land but are eventually trapped. Scholars have suggested that the attention Thucydides devotes to the soldiers’ physical condition, emotional state, and the immense scale of suffering reveal an Athenian bias. Though Athens exiled him and he is able to criticize the city’s leaders and their decisions, he may still be a patriot. Interestingly, Thucydides uses the language of divination—“boded evil”—but ties it to empirical facts: One need not be a soothsayer to recognize that sailors traveling on land and trusting foot soldiers instead of ships represents an illogical, even untenable, reversal (528). Reasonable analysis of facts, not oracles, indicates a negative outcome.

“When the news reached Athens, for a long time people would not believe it, even though they were given precise information from the very soldiers who had been present at the event and had escaped; still they thought that this total destruction was something that could not possibly be true. And when they did recognize the facts, they turned against the public speakers who had been in favor of the expedition, as though they themselves had not voted for it, and also became angry with the prophets and soothsayers and all who at the time had, by various methods of divination, encouraged them to believe that they would conquer Sicily. They were feeling the stress in every department and on every front, and now, after this last blow, great indeed was the fear that beset them and the consternation. [...] Nevertheless, with their limited resources, it was decided that they must not give in; [...] In fact, like all democracies, now that they were terrified, they were ready to put everything in order.” 

Thucydides critiques Athenian generals’ procrastination and inaction upon arriving at Sicily, which contrasts with the immediate action taken when they are faced with imminent danger. He also notes how outcomes can manipulate memory. People who supported the expedition based on their leaders’ speeches, prophecies that were interpreted favorably based on the public mood—both are rethought in the face of devastating defeat. This reformulating of past events also echoes the public’s response to the plague, when people adapt their memories “to suit their sufferings” (156).

“They did not go so far as to suggest getting rid of oligarchy altogether, but they maintained that the Five Thousand should be appointed so that this body should exist in real fact rather than as a mere name, and that the government should be set up on a wider basis. This, in fact, was mere political propaganda: it was for motives of personal ambition that most of them were following the line that is most disastrous to oligarchies when they take over from democracies. For no sooner is the change made than every single man, not content with being the equal of others, regards himself as greatly superior to everyone else. In a democracy, on the other hand, someone who fails to get elected to office can always console himself with the thought that there was something not quite fair about it. But what had the most evident effect in urging on the dissident party was the strength of Alcibiades’ position in Samos and the fact that they did not believe that the oligarchy would last. Each of them therefore tried to get in first as leader and champion of the people in general.” 

Alcibiades has sent a message back to Athens with the Four Hundred’s representatives urging them not to make any concessions to the enemy. As a result, many within the oligarchy form an opposition to criticize how it is being run. Thucydides does his usual character analysis, showing how self-interest can drive large-scale outcomes. Meanwhile, Alcibiades, who betrayed Athens first to Sparta then to Persia, continues his political intrigues, which do more to serve his desire for power than aid the people of his city.