logo

52 pages 1 hour read

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Globalization and Its Discontents

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2002

A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.

Chapters 7-9Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 7 Summary & Analysis: “Better Roads to the Market”

Stiglitz argues in this chapter that gradualist approaches that ignored the IMF’s shock therapy have ultimately seen greater success with deeper social reforms and better economic development. In other words, although the IMF believes its policies to have ultimately created a necessary evil in the short term, Stiglitz disagrees and believes there were alternative strategies that could have been pursued.

In this chapter, the author uses the successful cases of China and Poland to contrast the previous section on Russia’s failure. The main difference between China and Poland on one hand and Russia on the other is that the former countries focused on maintaining social stability rather than strictly stabilizing inflation (macroeconomic indices).

For example, China prioritized building a solid foundation to transition to a market economy before privatizing. Its government focused on creating jobs to fight unemployment, restructuring existing enterprises, installing social safety nets, and encouraging competition. It did not immediately privatize, nor did it democratize, instead allowing village enterprises and townships to generate wealth in their areas at the cost of accountability. As a result, China maintained its social capital, while in Russia, it eroded.

Ultimately, Stiglitz believes IMF’s vision was too narrow: It employed a very limited economic model and ignored dissenting voices. It overemphasized macrostability and ignored The Importance of Social Capital—entrepreneurship can only emerge at times of social and political stability. After all, social and structural change can only happen if the domestic government is interested in honest reforms.

In the end, Stiglitz proposes several changes for better future success. He argues that funds should be poured to encourage the building of institutions that would uphold the underpinnings of democracies, such as an independent press, spaces for research and public dialogue, and a robust education system that supports intellectual growth and encourages entrepreneurship.

This chapter demonstrates that hubris pushed the IMF and the US Treasury to believe they could incentivize this change from the outside by picking the right leaders without truly understanding the local situation. Of course, Russian officials who disingenuously used the IMF’s funds to line their pockets also share the blame for the depressed Russian economy. This serves to demonstrate that a simplistic, textbook approach that overemphasizes macrostability is insufficient for guiding massive transitioning markets: Pragmatism and adequate leadership are also necessary.

The author lists, for the first time, concrete examples of changes that could benefit the IMF. These ideas will be expanded upon in Chapters 8 and 9, providing an insight into Stiglitz’s own fundamental belief in globalization as a force for good. It at once exemplifies the idea that social capitaland not only quantitative data—is important to the stable long-term development of the economy while also highlighting that globalization is an inevitable process, which should be used to improve people’s standards of living and to fight for greater social justice.

Chapter 8 Summary & Analysis: “The IMF’s Other Agenda”

Chapter 8 observes the difference between Keynesian economics and free-market ideology, the former being the IMF’s original mandate, while the latter is its current driving force. This chapter contrasts the two major economic models that make up Globalization and Its Discontents: They are the foundational economic principles that govern the author’s thinking and shape his arguments.

The chapter begins with an introduction of English economist and mathematician John Maynard Keynes, the intellectual godfather of the IMF. He is known for having identified a set of market failures that could only be remedied through an international regulatory institution. He argued that free markets can encourage sustained unemployment and that, in a global economy, the actions of one country have the potential to affect neighbors.

Since one country’s exports are another’s imports, globalization will only increase interdependency between individual nations. Keynes pushed for the creation of institutions like the IMF to help the global economy remain stable by pressuring countries to maintain full employment rates and providing liquidity to avoid prolonged recessions. The ultimate goal is to maintain a steady global aggregate demand—this is the fundamental way to stimulate growth, even at times of economic recession.

Keynes’s views are starkly different from market fundamentalism, which prevailed within the IMF in Stiglitz’s time and dictates that free markets are largely self-regulatory and that government interference mostly affects the economy negatively. The IMF’s current policies—which run contrary to Keynes’s ideas at the institution’s inception—are insufficient for justifying its continued international interventions.

The IMF’s lack of internal coherence also results in it misdiagnosing the problem and prescribing the incorrect remedy. Stiglitz has argued thus far that, often, it deepens the problems it is intended to solve. For example, by imposing stringent interest rates to ensure that a single country does not import more than it exports, the IMF overlooks that, in a global economy, this implies another country is exporting more than it imports. This demonstrates a lack of coherence that encourages a narrow vision, undermining its utility as a regulatory institution for the global economy.

Moreover, the IMF developed a program of “bail-ins” after being criticized for its bailout policies. It encouraged private institutions to shoulder a portion of bailouts for the IMF, should the IMF decide to lend money. Ironically, then, the IMF, which was created to mitigate the liquidity crises in the credit market, refused to do exactly this unless it was backed up by the private sector. This in turn delegated significant power to independent lenders, who could now decide which country to help and which to ignore based on private interests rather than creditworthiness. Stiglitz points out that this practice undermines the very existence of the IMF.

This chapter shows that the core reason behind the Fund’s incoherency is that the organization aligns with the interests of the financial community. It no longer serves global economic interests but global financial interests, and this transition was purposely hidden from the public eye. The IMF itself is staffed by personnel from the financial community. For example, deputy managing director Stan Fischer was later hired to be the vice chairman at Citigroup. Robert Rubin, meanwhile, moved from Citigroup to the US Treasury and had a hand in enacting IMF policies. It is also the reason the IMF sought to shift the blame onto Asian countries: The institution wants to protect its advisers, who encouraged investors into lending these ventures.

Stiglitz also underlines that ideological dogmatism prevented the IMF and the US Treasury from admitting to their wrongdoing and redressing their mistakes, which fits into the major theme for why market fundamentalism ultimately rendered IMF policies inefficient. The financial crisis in Asia cast doubt on capitalism as the triumphant ideology emerging from the Cold War, so it was imperative to insist that something else was the root cause of the problem. 

Chapter 9 Summary & Analysis: “The Way Ahead”

Although globalization has largely been disastrous for the environment, for the poor, and for the stability of the global economy, in this final chapter, Stiglitz argues that it is still an indispensable part of the future. Globalization can be a power for good: It was at the root of East Asia’s success; allowed for the trade of goods, ideas, and technologies; and built a global civil society eager to fight for social justice.

The chapter begins with a description of the worldwide protests against the IMF. Although critics of the institution wish for its abolition, disbelieving that the institution can change at all given its ties to the financial world, as an economist of the Keynesian school, Stiglitz maintains that abolishing the IMF would only lead to the creation of a replacement because international institutions are essential for regulating economic crises. This is why one of the major themes of the book has to do with the inevitability of globalization as a socioeconomic phenomenon and The Necessity of Regulation to ensure its success. Stiglitz advocates for reforming globalization and the economic institutions that are to uphold it.

Stiglitz does not doubt the success of the market system over the communist system. However, the IMF and the US Treasury have upheld one specific vision of economics that has time and again proven to be flawed: market fundamentalism. Ideology discourages empiricism and has prevented the IMF from seeing that even successful markets can vary in implementation and operation. For example, in Sweden, the government has greater control over welfare, unemployment insurance, and retirement benefits than in the US. Thus, every country’s market operates in slightly different ways. Some of these differences come down to value judgements: For example, people might disagree on how much the environment can be destroyed in favor of greater economic growth or on how much tax people should pay to relieve the poor. Social cohesion also affects the way in which the economy functions.

Stiglitz advocates for a nuanced approach to government intervention. He recognizes that both the market and the government are capable of failing; it is only by working together that they can mitigate economic crises.

In other words, since globalization will not disappear, institutions should be implemented to regulate it. This is what Stiglitz calls “collective action”: It helps steer the economy when markets in themselves do not produce efficient outcomes. Having adequate institutions will also allow for greater cooperation between countries on issues that could affect the international scene, such as global warming and the AIDS crisis. With countries becoming increasingly interdependent comes the need for global public goods and regulatory infrastructure.

Stiglitz believes a change in governance is the key to reshaping globalization. It entails a democratic process whereby voices beyond those of trade ministers and financial tycoons are represented at the WTO and the IMF. Similarly, leadership should come from more than just the US Treasury. China’s presence at the WTO can shift the current pattern in bargaining power, even if it does not always represent the best interests of other developing countries. Although possible, Stiglitz remains pessimistic about the actual implementation of such changes in the short term at the IMF and the World Bank.

If immediate change in governance is impossible, then at least greater transparency could ensure greater accountability in the IMF’s decision-making process. This is because leaders of these international institutions are not elected, so they do not have to be directly accountable to the public, even though they are in place to serve the public.

The IMF and US Treasury’s focus on ideology encourages them to defend their infallibility: They protect their credibility at all costs and argue that their success hinges on this trust. Stiglitz proposes that, should a change from ideological dogmatism to pragmatism be impossible, the IMF’s involvement in development should be limited, and it should return to simply managing crises.

The author allows that some changes have been made: There is more talk on how to deal with issues of transparency and poverty inside the institution. Even senior managers have admitted that shortsightedness—defined as a focus on “hot money,” or short-term capital flows—can cost them in the long run. Despite these efforts, however, the IMF and the World Bank still remain opaquer than government in democracies, and any reform they implement faces strong opposition from financial centers.

Stiglitz proposes the following seven core reforms for the IMF: 1. To recognize the dangers of capital market liberalization; 2. A bankruptcy reform that incentivizes banking and management reforms; 3. A reduction in the distribution of bailout funds; 4. An improvement to banking regulations to mitigate bad lending practices; 5. The establishment of an insurance market to improve risk management from fluctuating exchange rates; 6. The establishment of social safety nets to protect those who are vulnerable and to help absorb risk; and 7. An improved response to crises through conducting more scientific forecasts based on data rather than ideology. In sum, he wishes for globalization to be viewed not as an economic phenomenon but as the inevitable path forward that affects people’s living standards. It should be gradual to mitigate disturbance to traditional customs with which it conflicts or to help smooth market transitions.

Stiglitz remains hopeful for the future of these international organizations because he has witnessed the change in the World Bank, even if it is slow. Similarly, the European Union has already taken a step toward better free-trading policies on all products except “Arms” (246). He wishes that developing countries could have the right to manage their own policies rather than facing imposed templates from the institutions that govern globalization. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, Keynes rose up to correct the idea that markets are always self-regulating; Stiglitz remains optimistic that the same might be taught to make globalization fairer, more sustainable, and more democratic.

blurred text
blurred text
blurred text
blurred text

Related Titles

By Joseph E. Stiglitz