Getting to Yes

The first three questions concern fairness and negotiating on principles:

1. “Does positional bargaining ever make sense?” (152). Positional bargaining is simple and expected. Inventing options based on the parties’ interests is more demanding, but it’s always better if the conflict is very important or complex, if the other side is a valued customer, or if a simple negotiation gets bogged down.

2. “What if the other side believes in a different standard of fairness?” (155). Conflicts over standards are less important than using standards in the first place. Differences can be hashed out, coin-flipped, or third-partied. Employing standard criteria is one of many approaches to solving a dispute, and it won’t make or break an agreement.

3. “Should I be fair if I don’t have to be?” (157). If a tempting opportunity arises to get an unfair advantage, it’s wise to consider the after-effects. You may lose the other side’s respect and willingness to work together; courts may reject the settlement as “unconscionable;” compliance may become too difficult; your reputation may suffer; and your conscience may haunt you.

The next three questions involve dealing with people:

4. ‘‘What do I do if the people are the problem?” (159). The first task is to nurture a cooperative relationship. Threats or concessions usually backfire and impede collaboration. Instead, separate personality issues from substantive discussions; this keeps the focus on solutions rather than egos. If the relationship still needs improving, avoid tit-for-tat reprisals, and treat this as a substantive issue to be solved with mutual effort. Search for acceptable standards that will govern both sides’ behavior.

If the other side seems to behave irrationally, it’s important to remember that they have a different viewpoint and probably believe they’re being rational. Sometimes talking it over can alter their perspective.

5. “Should I negotiate even with terrorists or someone like Hitler? When does it make sense not to negotiate?” (163). Not negotiating with a group is itself a negotiation tactic. Direct talks aren’t a form of surrender, and open communication can increase influence over the other party. There’s no need, though, for high-level officials to participate and thereby confer status on terrorists; instead, lower-level specialists can get excellent results, as when police negotiators talk down hostage takers.

Sometimes military action seems necessary; it can influence a negotiation, but wars don’t always get a better result. Talks, meanwhile, can generate agreements and reduce the need to fight. Even religious fundamentalists may engage in negotiation—not to compromise their principles but to find possible ways to resolve conflicts. The decision to negotiate should be based simply on whether a side’s BATNA is significantly worse than an agreement.

6. “How should I adjust my negotiating approach to account for differences of personality, gender, culture, and so on?” (168). People have different personal styles—bold, shy, logical, emotional. It’s wise to note how formal they are, how verbal, how fast or slow, how friendly, and so forth, and then adjust one’s own style as appropriate. Don’t assume that members of a particular culture all behave the same way. Use their culture as a guide, not a pigeonhole.

The next three questions focus on tactics:

7. “How do I decide things like ‘Where should we meet?’ ‘How should we communicate?’ ‘Who should make the first offer?’ and ‘How high should I start?’” (170). Meeting places depend on such factors as whether negotiators need to stay in their office, the best location for facilities and conference equipment, and whether a side wants the option to leave at any time.

Communication by writing and phone are the formats most prone to errors, while in-person talks allow for nonverbal understanding, which leads to better agreements. Written communication, though, allows for more time to think and permits more bluntness. If both sides are well-prepared and focus on discussing alternatives, it’s not important who makes the first offer. If a price is to be mentioned, the reasoning behind that figure should be given before the number, or it’s likely to be ignored.

In general, research and preparation are more important than a particular strategy. Devising tactics before knowing the other side’s strategy is likely to backfire, but being well-versed in the topic will make it easy to choose a path when the other sides introduces its approaches.

8. “Concretely, how do I move from inventing options to making commitments?” (175). To achieve closure, think ahead of time about what the end result will look like, then adapt that plan as more information rolls in during talks. A “framework agreement”—general principles written down with blanks for issues to be negotiated—can help keep bargaining on track.

Commitments should remain tentative until the entire agreement is ironed out. This permits both sides to adjust earlier understandings, and it speeds the process. Being persistent on issues but flexible on solutions keeps negotiations on track.

9. “How do I try out these ideas without taking too much risk?” (179). Start with a negotiation where the stakes are small, have a strong BATNA, and the other side will likely be open to bargaining over interests rather than positions. As your skills advance, try them on more difficult disputes. In each case, prepare well ahead of time, develop many solutions to each side’s issues, and roleplay the two sides. Afterwards, evaluate the success or failure of each part of the negotiation.

The final question is a double-query about negotiating power:

10. “‘Can the way I negotiate really make a difference if the other side is more powerful?’ And ‘How do I enhance my negotiating power?’” (181). The only way to bring someone to the table is if your offer is better than what they already have. When that’s impossible, focus instead on improving your own BATNA. If you have little to offer, your negotiating technique becomes paramount. Huge resources aren’t always useful as leverage: The US, for example, can’t realistically use its nuclear weapons against terrorists. It’s thus a mistake to base your chances on the apparent power of the other side.

Sources to forge a successful agreement can spring up mutually during a good negotiation. These include a strong relationship between the sides, good communication, understanding the other side’s interests, devising ingenious options, and using established standards. Additionally, power increases by having a strong BATNA as a fallback, and by making carefully crafted, limited commitments that increase trust and move talks forward.

It’s a mistake to use only one avenue of power when making an offer; much better to use all avenues together in a coordinated fashion that builds a compelling reason to reach an agreement. Finally, be consistent—“believe what you say and say what you believe” (194).