Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress

Pinker calls inequality a hot-button topic that the Great Recession of 2007 and the Occupy Wall Street movement it prompted made especially relevant. Many believe that the richest 1% of society hoard too much wealth, impoverishing the rest of the population. Pinker admits that “economic inequality undoubtedly has increased in most western countries” (97) in the last few decades. The Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, gives a 0 rating to a society in which everyone has exactly the same amount. Scandinavian countries rate about a 0.25, while less egalitarian South Africa is at 0.7. In recent decades, this rating has increased in the US. Pinker notes that analyzing inequality is famously difficult but claims that he’ll disprove “dystopian” narratives about the failure of modern society.

He argues that inequality isn’t morally wrong; it’s poverty that is immoral. To illustrate his point, he references an old Russian joke: Two peasants work hard to survive; one is slightly better off because he owns a goat. When a genie grants the more impoverished peasant a wish, he wishes for his neighbor’s goat to die. With his wish fulfilled, the men are now truly equal, but neither is any better off. This humorous illustration helps reveal the poor logic that sometimes fuels the desire for total equality. He expands on the point by explaining that if everyone has enough to live well and comfortably, the wealth of others doesn’t matter: “What is morally important is that each should have enough” (98). This illustration, and Pinker’s clarifications about poverty versus inequality, help expose the differences between these societal phenomena and help Pinker avoid appearing callous or unconcerned about poverty while generating interest in the difference.

Pinker observes that many people’s sense of well-being and happiness relies on having as much as others, which social psychology refers to as “status anxiety.” Pinker challenges the theory set out by the authors of The Spirit Level, who contend that social inequality is a major cause of various social ills, from homicide and imprisonment to physical and mental health conditions to drug abuse. The author rejects this as a “problematic” theory resulting from a “tangle of correlations” (100). In taking on this opposing theory, Pinker anticipates possible criticism and points out flaws in his peers’ research. His penchant for quantitative research helps him show that correlation isn’t causation and that The Spirit Level hasn’t adequately proven that inequality in itself is a real cause of social problems.

The author notes that inegalitarian nations like Singapore are “socially healthier” than slightly richer, more egalitarian countries in Eastern Europe. He cites sociologists Jonathan Kelley and Mariah Evans’ study on 200 thousand people over three decades, which showed that people in unequal societies are happier than those in more equal ones. Pinker attributes this data to people’s sense of hope and aspirations that increasing education, new opportunities, and hard work may pay off later in life. He cites another major review, which claims that people prefer unequal societies if the wealth distribution seems logical and meritocratic.

Pinker claims that hunter-gatherer societies are less egalitarian than thinkers such as Marx claimed, particularly sedentary (non-nomadic) communities that can accumulate and store wealth. He points to the Indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest as an example because they owned slaves, had various statuses, and accumulated wealth that the elites shared in potlatches. Pinker references a study showing that wealth distribution in hunter-gatherer societies isn’t particularly egalitarian, with a Gini rating of 0.33. This anthropological perspective helps Pinker show that inequality is natural and inherent—and doesn’t automatically have an ill effect on happiness. This helps support the author’s point that inequality—and people’s awareness about it—is universal across all societies. He reiterates that inequality isn’t equivalent to high rates of poverty because as countries get richer, they inevitably become less equal as people move into the middle or upper class.

Pinker refers to economist Walter Scheidel’s Four Horsemen of Leveling: wars, pandemics, state collapse, and revolution. These forces decimate everyone’s wealth, and the population becomes equally poor; Scheidel noted that these are more common than reducing inequality by decreasing poverty. Pinker argues that the most reliable way to reduce poverty in modern times is through a market economy and government programs that tax the wealthy at higher rates and redistribute citizens’ wealth. This social safety net, or welfare state, became common among most developed nations after World War II, when countries such as Canada, Sweden, Japan, and the US began spending an average of 22% of their GDP on social programs such as health care, education, and assistance. Pinker describes the rise in social spending as an “inexorable tectonic force” (109) and refers to how, despite vocal opposition, US social spending has continued to increase in recent years. “Wagner’s Law” dictates that as a country’s GDPs increases, so does its social spending. Pinker calls this a “manifestation of progress” (109) because it correlates with increased health, education, and prosperity. He notes that the world has no “libertarian paradises” (110) because all developed countries have significant social spending.

However, Pinker acknowledges that social spending’s benefits to a society plateau at about 25% of GDP. All social spending is a combination of “insurance, investment, and charity” (110) that work best if a nation’s people have a strong sense of community. Pinker considers the tension around social spending “inherent” and always “politically contentious” (110). This point restrains his optimism by showing that he doesn’t believe a perfect formula for social spending exists that one day all societies will accept; instead, he anticipates continued political conflict over the issue.

The author transitions to discussing how globalization has increased wealth over the last several decades. Regardless of how one interprets the data, Pinker maintains, globalization “helped the lower and middle classes of poor countries, and the upper class of rich countries, much more than it helped the lower middle class of rich countries” (113). However, from a global perspective, this “tradeoff” was worthwhile in terms of improving people’s quality of life. According to economist Stephen Rose, since 1979, all US citizens, on average, have become wealthier; the middle class is decreasing since more citizens earn enough to be considered upper class. Pinker reiterates his thoughts about the “optimism gap,” noting that most US citizens think the middle-class standard of living has declined in recent years while their own has improved. The increase in overall wealth has been most notable at the bottom of US society; in 2015 and 2016, the poverty rate dropped significantly, and homelessness rates decreased by a third between 2007 and 2015. Moreover, the conditions in which poor Americans live today are far better than they were a century ago: Low-income homes often have modern conveniences such as computers, phones, and appliances. By again referencing the “optimism gap,” Pinker draws attention to the chasm between the reality of the data and people’s perceptions or feelings.

Pinker acknowledges the significant problems in modern economies, including the cost of university tuition, the automation of jobs, a “regressive” US tax system, and the cynicism about the economy, which results in “beggar-thy-neighbor” politics (118). Pinker reiterates that inequality itself isn’t always a negative thing and that its critics should focus more on “specific problems” such as boosting economic growth and encouraging government management of social services like retirement funds and healthcare. Universal basic income may soon become another facet of countries’ social assistance, which could help lower inequality by lifting people out of poverty. In closing the chapter, Pinker reiterates that inequality and poverty aren’t the same thing and emphasizes that societies aren’t becoming dystopian or declining in wealth: “In some ways the world has become less equal, but in more ways the world’s people have become better off” (120). Pinker urges a focus on reducing poverty through proven means rather than responding with panic to news about inequality.

The author acknowledges that environmental problems are real and significant, and he hopes to show—through arguments “grounded in Enlightenment optimism rather than Romantic declinism” (121)—that we’ve made and can continue to make progress in this area. He lauds the environmental movement of the 1960s, which “deserves credit for substantial achievements” (121) in protecting nature.

Pinker argues that some environmentalists espouse a philosophy he calls “greenism” (122), which he compares to religious ideology. Greenism views humans in negative terms, as a kind of virus or parasite that must be reduced to save the earth and avoid a sort of “environmental Judgement Day” (122). He questions whether continuing human progress without negative consequences for nature is possible. He prefers a perspective called eco-pragmatism (or ecomodernism), which contends that people have always created pollution or waste in their landscapes and that living in total harmony with nature is impossible. Even modern-day provincial or national parks are usually established only after Indigenous people have been “decimated or forcibly removed from them” (123). By mentioning this “dirty secret,” Pinker casts doubt on notions of a pristine and untouched wilderness that some environmentalists esteem.

From the eco-pragmatist perspective, farming inherently disrupts nature, and Pinker argues that “natural farming” is nonexistent (123). Moreover, industrialization benefits humanity by providing more nutrition, better healthcare, longer lifespans, and many other conveniences. Additionally, eco-pragmatists argue that new technology can help us live well without damaging the environment.

Pinker summarizes why some environmentalists object to eco-pragmatism, including a dim view of technology, the impression that people will continue to consume as wastefully as they do now, and alarmism about the global population. The author references numerous 20th-century alarmist arguments about overconsumption of natural resources, especially precious minerals and metals, pointing out that none of these predictions came to pass. Instead, societies identified new sources for these goods, shifted to using recycled materials in their products, or developed new technologies. By identifying these poor predictions, Pinker exposes how underestimating government, corporate, and consumer capability to change underlies a poor understanding of how societies can continue to flourish despite environmental challenges. In addition, these examples help support his argument that people shouldn’t assume we’ll suddenly run out of finite resources, since we have the flexibility to switch to more carbon-efficient ways to grow food and heat our homes over time. Thus, we needn’t assume that our consumption of certain goods will remain the same and project it into the future.

To counter “greenism” and its cynicism about civilization, Pinker notes that the US population has only grown since the 1970s, yet we’ve eliminated many air pollutants, and energy use has plateaued. This disproves right-wing arguments that environmentalism has a ruinous effect on the economy, as well as Greenist assumptions that “degrowth” and reducing population are the only paths to decreasing environmental damage.

Other environmental successes include the slowing rate of deforestation, the reforestation of unused farmland, reduction in oil spills, and decreases in lethal forms of pollution such as contaminated drinking water and the smoke that indoor fires create. Additionally, governments have devoted more land to conservation areas, increasing the total amount of the earth’s protected areas to more than 14% of its total land mass. Wildlife conservation efforts have helped save endangered animals such as condors and pandas, and numerous international agreements have helped eliminate harmful chemicals, allowing the ozone layer to begin repairing itself. These successes can continue if people engage in activism, knowledge-sharing, and cooperation to achieve specific goals. Pinker discourages identifying with narratives that frame people as “plunderers” who have an inherently parasitic relationship with the earth.

He argues that one important aspect of progress is the ability to produce more food from the same amount of land. The digital age is helping us reduce what we own and the amount of material in different technologies. The online-based sharing economy enables people to share cars, rooms, and other goods, increasing efficiencies. Pinker notes that these types of progress haven’t occurred due to government intervention or activism: “Something in the nature of technology, particularly information technology, works to decouple human flourishing from the exploitation of physical stuff” (135).

The author synthesizes the causes and possible consequences of climate change, explaining the importance of keeping overall warming to only two degrees Celsius to avoid the worst outcomes, which are likely with a four-degree warming. He calls climate change the “most vigorously challenged scientific hypothesis in history” (137) and notes that the evidence is so overwhelming that of more than 69,000 scientists, only four reject it. He calls efforts to undermine climate science and conspiracy theories that tie scientists to big-government takeover “fanatical and mendacious” (138) and attributes these ideas to politicians whom fossil fuel companies support. Pinker’s strong condemnation of anti-climate-change political activism emphasizes that carbon pollution is a real problem that requires significant attention and problem-solving. This aspect of his argument lends nuance to his analysis and helps him avoid appearing naive or nonchalant.

Pinker disagrees with leftist environmentalists such as Naomi Klein who claim that climate change is more of a human rights issue and necessitates overhauling political systems. Pinker considers her derogatory depiction of quantitative analysis as “‘bean counting’ […] anti-intellectual” (139) because statistics are an important part of understanding trends and events and building fact-based arguments. He expresses both disbelief and disappointment in Klein’s activism against a 2016 US carbon tax (which didn’t pass into law), implying that her puritanical interpretation of right and wrong helped prevent an important milestone in progress against climate change. Pinker’s defense of the value of quantitative thinking in addressing climate change emphasizes the theme Rationality and Quantitative Evidence.

Likewise, Pinker rejects arguments that developing countries shouldn’t industrialize the way that wealthy nations have, to avoid the increased carbon emissions inherent in such progress, because this is an unfair expectation. Furthermore, becoming wealthier will help developing nations better cope with climate change. In addition, he warns against overly moralizing climate-change activism that demonizes fossil fuels and celebrates small, symbolic sacrifices that don’t significantly help the planet.

Pinker argues strongly in favor of a carbon tax because it incentivizes companies and consumers to reduce carbon consumption or switch to carbon-neutral methods. In addition, he lauds nuclear power as a promising alternative to current energy sources because it’s far more efficient than renewable energy sources such as wind and solar farms and requires far less space. Pinker quotes Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s argument: “‘There is no credible path to reducing global carbon emissions without an enormous expansion of nuclear power’” (146). He laments that many people are frightened of nuclear power because of well-known accidents like the Chernobyl disaster but notes that it’s safer than other forms of energy production according to statistics on annual fatalities and other dangers. Nuclear power plants produce denser, cheaper energy much more cleanly than alternative methods. To succeed, Pinker says, society needs “a regulatory environment that is suited to 21th-century challenges rather than 1970s-era technophobia and nuclear dread” (149). Again, he emphasizes the role of reason, equating “nuclear dread” and “technophobia” with emotional reactions based on anecdotal rather than statistical evidence. This too supports the theme Rationality and Quantitative Evidence.

Turning his attention to the future, Pinker offers examples of how humanity might continue to make progress against climate change. He analyzes the various options to produce fewer greenhouse gases and remove them from the atmosphere. Such methods include removing carbon dioxide from smokestacks or the atmosphere by capturing it and pumping it into the ground, or dispersing broken rocks, which absorb carbon as they erode. If our energy feedstocks, or sources, switch to using biomass materials such as forest debris and compost, we could even achieve carbon-negative energy. This method, called “Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage” (151), has been hailed as a “savior technology.” Pinker praises international efforts like the Paris Agreement, which aims to keep global warming within 1.5 degrees Celsius. In addition, he’s hopeful about technologies that help quickly reduce temperatures by blocking sunlight, such as dispersing sulfates or seawater into the air, but warns that this is only helpful if countries cooperate on how to use the technology and don’t consider it an excuse to ignore climate problems. While Pinker doesn’t explicitly state it, these points are an important part of why he’s optimistic about the future and refuses to entertain fatalist, cynical narratives about humans and the environment. By enumerating new technologies and clean energy methods, Pinker urges agreement with his assessment that we’re making progress on environmental issues. He concludes the chapter by reiterating that he believes humans will “rise to the challenge” of meaningfully confronting climate change and that he’s “conditionally optimistic” about continued development and agreements to solve this historic problem.