79 pages • 2 hours read
Steven PinkerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Pinker claims that many intellectuals don’t value progress and even scoff at the notion that gaining knowledge about the world can improve people’s lives. He references the many derogatory terms they use to describe proponents of Enlightenment thinking, such as “Pollyanna,” “naive optimist,” or “vulgar American can-doism” (39). Pessimism is commonplace in Western intellectual history; Nietzche, Benjamin, Sartre, Foucault, and other leading thinkers offered cynical analyses of society. This pessimism, which Pinker claims was once more limited to intellectuals, is now widespread throughout Western society. He cites various studies showing that people judge the economy, environment, crime rates, and other social problems as much worse than they really are, a phenomenon he calls the “Optimism Gap” (40).
The author attributes the optimism gap to the news media’s penchant for reporting negative stories and focusing on rare, sensational, and deadly events. He points out that media outlets tend to report recent negative events rather than following successful long-term projects. This encourages the “availability heuristic,” in which people consider something likelier if they can think of many examples of its happening. This leads to significant misestimations, such as the belief that tornadoes kill more people than asthma annually in the US. Pinker cites studies showing that frequent news consumers often feel anxious or fatalistic and significantly misperceive the risk of unfortunate events.
Pinker argues that “the answer is to count” (43) how many people experience a problem; quantitative analysis is “morally enlightened” because it treats every life as having equal value—and encourages people to consider solutions to reduce the incidence of problems. The goal of his book The Better Angels of Our Nature was to illuminate the reality of progress for people through convincing statistical data showing reductions in crime and war and an increase in human rights and quality of life. Pinker laments that many struggle to overcome the penchant for pessimism despite such thorough data, and he rejects accusations of being naive or unrealistic because the data demonstrates that violence has decreased. He clarifies that he isn’t claiming that violence has disappeared or that crime or war will never increase but is charting their decline so that we can better understand the conditions that helped improve society and thereby replicate and strengthen those conditions. Pinker admonishes those who try to use “semantics” to refute clear data—for example, equating internet trolling or destructive mining with violence to argue that violence has increased: “War, crime, pollution, poverty, disease, and incivility are evils that may have little in common, and if we want to reduce them, we can’t play word games that make it impossible to discuss them individually” (47).
In addition to the “availability bias” and optimism gap, Pinker names another bias—the “negativity bias” in the human mind—that makes it difficult to believe positive data (47). Psychological data shows that this bias makes it easier to imagine unfortunate events than positive ones and that we register criticism more deeply than validation. Pinker notes that the English language has more negative terms than positive ones. Additionally, people tend to misremember the past as better than it was, creating nostalgia. Pinker laments that intellectuals’ work often supports these biases rather than questioning them. He critiques journalists, critics, and intellectuals for complaining about negative trends and events to “attain instant gravitas” (49). He sees pessimism among society’s elites as a symptom of competition, a “form of one-upmanship” (49). Pinker argues that his evaluation of the uptick in “Progressophobia” isn’t just another manifestation of that bias. He cites a study by Kalev Leetaru, who reviewed every New York Times article between 1945 and 2005 and found that they became steadily more negative. Pinker invites further reflection on how this negative media trend may influence culture.
Pinker defines progress as any increase in health, wealth, peace, freedom, human rights, literacy, knowledge, or opportunity and notes that these aspects of life are all measurable. In 2000, all UN members committed to goals that reflect many of these values, and Pinker reports that the world has successfully improved “every single measure of human well-being” (52)—but he’s shocked that so few people know about it. Reiterating how little people know about positive advances in health, safety, and education, Pinker implies that media and educational institutions don’t effectively inform the public about societal improvements and instead focus on negative events and crime. This observation leads smoothly to the next chapter, which more thoroughly examines recent human progress.
The author explores the extraordinary gains societies have made in extending the human lifespan, noting that in 2015 the average lifespan, calculated globally, was 71 years, whereas in 1700s America and Europe, the average lifespan was only 35 years (though longer than in other societies in that period). This relatively short lifespan was common in the preceding centuries as well. Lifespan is yet another area in which most people pessimistically underestimate societal progress.
Pinker uses a graph from Max Roser’s Our World in Data to illustrate how dramatically human lifespans increased globally from the 18th to the 21st centuries. The average lifespan is now around 80 years in Europe and 60 years in Africa. The flu epidemic of the early 20th century and, later, the AIDS crisis disrupted this progress, illustrating that progress isn’t always a linear process and we can’t take it for granted. One of the main reasons the average lifespan has increased so much is that infant mortality rates have significantly decreased. Pinker shares statistics showing that in 18th-century Sweden, about a third of all children died as infants, but the rate today is nearly zero. Pinker notes that this decline “went global”: Infant mortality has decreased on every continent since 1950, and he includes another graph to prove it. The author holds that this “triumph of human well-being” (56) has resulted in more stable populations—because parents whose children survive have fewer total children—and that millions of people are now spared the tragedy of losing young children. Likewise, maternal mortality has decreased; the global rate is now 0.2%. The author’s use of statistics and graphs in this section lends more credibility and relatability to his argument and is particularly impactful in showing the rapid progress in countries such as Malaysia, South Korea, and Ethiopia.
In addition, Pinker notes, people who survive to adulthood are living longer, healthier lives than previous generations. He cites the Global Burden of Disease project to demonstrate that people don’t spend these additional years of life “senile in a rocking chair” (59) but tend to enjoy good quality of life. The author ponders whether humans might eventually overcome mortality itself, concluding that it’s highly unlikely because of evolution and entropy. Evolution has biased our bodies toward being productive and vigorous while young but not necessarily investing in a long lifespan. While Pinker doubts that humans can avoid death entirely, this chapter helps illustrate the enormous gains that societies have made in recent centuries to extend the human lifespan.
Pinker calls infectious diseases the “strongest force of death” (62) in human history because they threaten both rich and poor and have killed millions in epidemics. Developments such as vaccinations and basic hygiene marked a departure and significant advancement from traditional medicine, which included blood-letting, using metals or making sacrifices, and prayer. Medical research prompted people to improve living conditions through sewage management, clean water, hand washing, and mosquito control—efforts that saved billions of lives. By contrasting a scientific approach and the effective measures it introduced with old assumptions and superstitions, Pinker reinforces the importance of Enlightenment thinking in producing lifesaving knowledge.
The author lists people whose inventions and discoveries saved billions of lives, including Jonas Salk, who invented the polio vaccine, and John Snow, an epidemiologist who helped identify causes of cholera. The author laments that since recent generations haven’t had to contend with these terrible illnesses and no longer live in fear of them, we take their elimination for granted. He notes that numerous other devastating diseases and parasites, such as hookworm, measles, sleeping sickness, and the guinea worm, are declining too and questions whether anyone will celebrate and express gratitude to scientists for their efforts to eradicate them. The author uses another graph to show that since 1990, reduction in illnesses such as pneumonia, diarrhea, and malaria has saved more than 100 million children. Pinker notes that while many factors contribute to improving global health, all inventions and policies begin with ideas. He reiterates that “progress can be reversed by bad ideas” (67), such as unfounded theories about vaccines causing sterilization or autism.
Famine has long been a major problem for human populations. Even wealthy nations routinely experienced famine until recently; Pinker cites a late 19th-century famine in Sweden as an example. He quotes a primary source that explains how in 1868 Sweden, “emaciated, starving children were often seen going from farm to farm begging for a few crumbs of bread” (68). This tragic account helps illustrate the desperation people experienced during food shortages, which Pinker says occurred every few decades. He observes that, incredibly, in today’s developed countries, people are more at risk of obesity-related diseases than starvation.
Although the global population has increased significantly in recent centuries, we access nutrition more reliably, even in developing nations. China, India, and African countries now average at least 2,400 calories per day, per person. This improvement has lowered rates of medical conditions such as growth stunting and wasting. Pinker reiterates that these gains occurred while the human population increased by billions worldwide. While nations such as Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Nigeria have experienced famines in recent decades, these tragedies had lower death rates than previous famines.
Pinker explains that the rapid increase in global population in the 20th century alarmed many, including biologist Paul R. Ehrlich, whose early work included the 1968 book The Population Bomb. Ehrlich, like many other intellectuals, was convinced then that the world would be unable to sustain more people and even predicted that 65 million Americans and four billion others would starve in the 1980s. Pinker notes that such thinking had real consequences: Some politicians proposed stopping foreign aid and discouraged health care investment, while countries such as China and India practiced forced sterilization or abortion. By examining misconceptions about agriculture and population, Pinker again emphasizes the weakness of unfounded theories that operate largely on assumption and simplistic interpretation of data. He emphasizes the importance of careful analysis in scientific predictions and condemns needless alarmism, which harms rather than helps society’s goals.
The author notes that this alarmism was unwarranted for two reasons: Americans’ quality of life and access to birth control improved, so they had fewer children than previous generations, while farmers and scientists greatly increased food yields. Agricultural technology such as combine harvesters, fertilizers, irrigation, and better plant breeding has enabled the world to produce much more food using the same amount of land—and at far lower costs than in previous centuries. Moreover, scientist Norman Borlaug began the “Green Revolution” in the 1950s and 1960s by breeding new strains of wheat, rice, and corn that increased yields; and this approach continues to help expand yields of other foods.
Pinker argues strongly in favor of “transgenic […] or genetically modified crops” (77), which various studies and organizations have deemed safe to eat. He holds that because of human selection and breeding of plants over millennia, all crops can be considered “genetically modified” and that transgenic techniques could become an essential part of the “Green Revolution” by allowing farmers in regions with poor soil to effectively grow abundant and nutritious crops.
The author acknowledges the downsides of major agricultural developments such as increased fossil fuel use, pesticides and herbicides, and the creation of massive industrial agriculture companies. However, he argues that critics should consider them acceptable since the advances have made famines almost obsolete. He adds that we should continue to improve processes to eliminate those downsides. Pinker attacks anti-GMO environmentalists who consider genetically modified food “unnatural” and therefore bad, arguing that such advocates are too concerned about pursuing the romantic notion of keeping plants natural or sacred. He considers them ignorant about how genetically modified crops could help feed vulnerable populations in the agriculturally challenged regions of Africa. In responding to attacks on industrial agriculture and GMO science, Pinker portrays these critics as relying on feeling rather than reason and presents his view as based on objective scientific data showing that agricultural advances have been successful. Additionally, he notes that the continuing “Green Revolution” and its new scientific discoveries require open-mindedness.
The author adds that many famines are human-made; historically, governments such as Stalin’s USSR and European colonial officials in Africa and Asia created famine conditions either accidentally or to intentionally starve certain populations. Most famine victims in the 20th century died during engineered famines in communist countries such as the USSR, China, and North Korea. Now that we have the knowledge and technology to produce food in abundance, “the decline of famine depends on the decline of poverty, war, and autocracy” (78).
By Steven Pinker
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