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Stephanie McCurryA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
The exclusion of enslaved people from the politics of the Confederacy was “as close to a founding principle as the Confederacy had” (218). While white women were officially excluded from the political process, they were nonetheless entitled to the protection of the state. Enslaved people, by contrast, had no such protections. The institution of enslavement made them subordinate to their masters, but treated them as entirely outside the compass of the state. Traditionally, in societies where enslavement was a major economic, political, and social factor, enslavement strengthened individual enslaver households and weakened the state. This was also true for the United States and the CSA.
The CSA’s Constitution defined enslaved people as property, mandated that any new states have legalized enslavement, and prohibited the federal government from limiting enslavement. During the Civil War, because Confederates thought of enslaved people as “part of the nation’s natural resources” (223), they planned to use enslaved labor for military camps, military police, and engineers and builders. Given that enslaved people made up roughly 40% of the South’s population, there were even proposals for enslaved soldiers, though these proposals were rejected out of fear that arming enslaved people would lead to rebellion. Planters recognized the dangers the war posed for their control over enslaved people, increasing the number of patrols and asking for state support in providing protection. Even so, McCurry argues that Confederate leaders were largely oblivious to the problems enslavement posed for the war effort.
McCurry emphasizes that enslaved people actively resisted enslavement. One enslaved man, William Webb, founded an organization of enslaved people who hoped for the election of the anti-enslavement presidential candidate John C. Frémont in 1856. When Frémont was defeated, Webb’s group turned to trying to encourage rebellion. They developed networks including enslaved and formerly enslaved people along with anti-enslavement whites who could spread news across states and help enslaved people escape to Canada. Also, enslaved people developed maps to secret meeting places and remote hideouts. Despite the efforts of planters to suppress such information, they were further able to keep track of national and international news, especially presidential elections, emancipations in the Caribbean, and the existence of the Republic of Haiti, which was founded through a rebellion in which enslaved people overthrew their enslavers. Often, such information spread through “prophetic rumor” (231), with some enslaved people in Richmond believing they would be freed in two months after Lincoln’s election. Enslaved people developed their “own, directly adversarial interpretation of secession” (232), as the Civil War opened up the possibility that all enslaved people in the South would be emancipated.
News of Lincoln’s election spurred on resistance by enslaved people. In Georgia, the planter Charles Manigault had long been facing acts of resistance from his enslaved workers, and this resistance increased in the wake of Lincoln’s election. Manigault recognized that the enslaved people on his plantation had been galvanized by Union victories in the Civil War. As a result, he tried to get rid of the ringleaders of the resistance by sending them to workhouses, selling them, and moving them to more remote places. Lincoln’s election triggered such resistance on plantations and slaveholding farms across the Confederacy. “Slaveholders and local officials reported unprecedented levels of slave activity, discerning evidence of all sorts that slaves were poised for action” (239). Reports of enslaved insurrections came from rural areas across the South, and enslaved people fled, often in mass numbers, to cross Union lines. Union generals like Benjamin Butler justified freeing enslaved people who crossed Union lines as confiscating contraband property to undermine the Confederate war effort. At first, planters blamed escapes by large numbers of enslaved people on Union interference, but eventually they had to admit that the enslaved people themselves desired freedom.
The ways enslaved people resisted during the war varied by region. In Georgia’s low country and South Carolina, enslaved people could contact the Union navy for help with mass escapes from plantations. Because enslaved people were often spread across smaller farms in the Upper South, this was harder to arrange. Because places near the Confederate-United States border like Winchester, Virginia, were frequently occupied and reoccupied by the Union and the Confederacy, it was risky but also easier for enslaved people to find allies among Union forces. After the Emancipation Proclamation was passed in January of 1863, enslaved people, backed by Union soldiers, went to their old plantations with official orders to release their families. Some enslaved people remained, fearing that the war would turn and leave them at the mercy of the Confederacy again, not trusting Union officers, or fearing for their loved ones. In Winchester, enslaved people who were recaptured by the Confederacy were tried in a court-martial and, if found guilty, executed. Still, even in Confederate territory, planters found themselves losing their authority.
The situation was complicated in Louisiana and Mississippi, which “became a patchwork of Union and Confederate land” (245). Even Union military camps differed in whether they would accept or turn away fugitive enslaved people. In deference to Unionist planters, southern Louisiana was exempt from the Emancipation Proclamation, but even there some Union officers did accept enslaved people seeking protection. Meanwhile, the Union army refused to offer protection to a planter’s wife, Mrs. Bragg, who requested protection from her enslaved workers. Since many Confederate politicians were enslavers, their politics were mixed up with their priorities in protecting their own plantations. President Davis had his family and its enslaved workers moved from New Orleans to Alabama, even as he tried to convince the Confederate general Van Dorn to liberate his plantations at Davis Bend, Mississippi. Some of the people Davis had enslaved escaped with the Union army. Others were recaptured, although they fought back. People formerly enslaved by Davis led Union soldiers to where his private property was hidden and looted it. Still, President Davis clung to the “orthodox view of slaves as loyal to their masters” (258), blaming enslaved resistance on manipulations by the Union such as the Emancipation Proclamation. On the other hand, actual planters believed they faced rebellion by enslaved people. In Louisiana, both planters and Union officers invoked the historical memory of the Haitian Revolution. McCurry reframes the Civil War as in part “a massive rebellion of the Confederacy’s slaves” (262).
At the beginning of the Civil War, the Confederates believed that enslavement gave them an advantage that would equal the fact that the northern United States had a larger population. To achieve that end, the Confederacy impressed enslaved people as labor for the state. This represented “something altogether new in terms of central state power and the interposition of government authority into the delicate relation of master and slave” (266). The policy of impressing enslaved people into state labor fueled complaints to state officials and governors from planters, some of whom outright refused to obey. Some planters even claimed that their enslaved workers refused to work for the state. They did not mention the obvious irony in bringing up the consent of enslaved people. One concern was that putting enslaved people close to enemy lines meant they would try to escape into Union territory, an issue that caused President Davis to grant several exemptions to Virginian counties. Confederate politicians and military leaders clashed during the debate. Because of this opposition, the Confederate leader General Magruder did not receive the enslaved labor he needed for the defenses of Virginia.
Impressment of enslaved people also excited anxieties about enslaved soldiers, who, by serving in the military, would then have a presumed claim on personhood and citizenship. The South’s use of enslaved people as military labor also allowed the Union to consider them “contraband” (271), meaning that freeing them from the Confederacy was a legitimate war goal. However, it also made Union military officers less willing to take in enslaved women and children. Union policy gave preference to the wives of enslaved men over unmarried enslaved women.
Many Southern planters viewed impressment as a radical violation of their property rights, impressment laws often went unenforced or partially enforced at the local level, had to be delayed, or had to be enacted with limitations like financial compensation. In the end, only six of the eleven Confederate states enacted impressment laws. It was noted that slaveholders “offered more opposition to slave impressment than to conscription” (284). When impressment was carried out, it enabled enslaved people to see “unprecedented cracks in the masters’ power” (283). They further saw the power of the state and the weakness of their enslavers in areas occupied by the Union army. Even as the Confederacy was pushed to the brink after December 1864, Governor Smith of Virginia was unable to overcome opposition from planters and local officials. Desperation and the failure of impressment also forced President Davis in November of 1864 to call for changing the law to recognize enslaved people as persons in a bid to secure their allegiance to the Confederacy.
While planters put demands on precious military resources for protection to prevent revolts, the Confederate War Department had to consider reevaluating the status of enslaved men. Enslaved resistance to the Confederacy during the war proved a decisive factor. Enslaved people helped Union prisoners of war escape and provided valuable military intelligence. When a citizens’ committee in Liberty County, Georgia, demanded that enslaved people who escaped and were recaptured be punished under military law, it was a recognition that enslaved people were citizens with an obligation to the law, where previously they had been viewed as their enslavers’ property and thus as outside the scope of the law. In addition, planters constantly demanded that the military devote resources to preventing escapes and revolts. Planters even refused to remove enslaved people proven to be giving intelligence and other forms of support to the Union. They resisted laws ordering the removal of enslaved people from territories endangered by the Union, putting “the protection of their property claims above the demands of patriotism” (299).
In March of 1862, in Pensacola in Florida, six enslaved men were court-martialed for giving military intelligence to the Union. Three were executed, and three were brutally beaten. This raised questions in the government about whether enslaved people could be considered traitors. In the history of the Confederacy and the United States, there was no precedent for enslaved people being found guilty of treason at all. Legally, enslaved people were considered to owe allegiance to their enslavers, not to the state. This question was never definitively resolved.
McCurry argues that enslavement—and thus the exclusion of enslaved people from politics—was “as close to a founding principle as the Confederacy had” (218). At the same time, enslavement was a major, inherent weakness for the Confederacy and one of The Causes of the Confederacy’s Collapse. Many Confederate officials, up to President Jefferson Davis, believed in a racist ideology that held that enslaved Black people were so naturally docile and loyal they only posed a danger when white outsiders manipulated and provoked them. This is what McCurry means when she argues that in the South, African Americans were “racial subjects, not political ones” (33). This distinction is itself an example of The Intersections of Gender, Race, Class, and Power: Black Southerners’ racial identity in a white supremacist political system meant that they were systematically deprived of political representation. In practice, all this meant that “white Confederates showed uncommonly little sagacity about the dilemma war provoked” (226): Confederate leaders fought hard against the idea that enslaved people could be enlisted in the military, especially in exchange for emancipation, and did not seriously take into account the fact that enslaved people would inevitably seize upon the Civil War as an opportunity to gain freedom. Many planters learned from experience what enslaved people were actually capable of, even if their leaders did not. This is why McCurry argues, “That the Civil War was, among other things, a massive slave rebellion seems clear in hindsight” (259).
Another problem emerged from the fact that enslavement motivated and empowered planters to put their own interests as a class above the needs of the state and the army. The significance of enslavement to the Confederacy, the very fact that resistance by enslaved people proved such an ongoing crisis, and the importance of planters as a class in the Confederate economy and government made all of this a fatal weakness in the Confederate cause. Up until the end of the Civil War, planters constantly resisted policies of forcibly conscripting or removing enslaved people from territories vulnerable to Union attack Further, they frequently demonstrated the weakness of the Confederate government. According to McCurry, “The mix of compromised state sovereignty and slaves’ political agency proved lethal in the C.S.A.” (300).
Not unlike McCurry’s previous discussion of how women’s political activism forced both the Confederacy and the Union to recognize women as political actors, enslaved Southerners similarly forced the government to acknowledge them—however reluctantly or indirectly—as independent political agents instead of just property. In an example of Women and Enslaved People as Drivers of History, enslaved people not only seriously undermined the Confederate war effort through their resistance and collaboration with the Union, they also forced a reevaluation of their status. In accusing enslaved people of treason against the Confederate cause, the CSA inadvertently acknowledged them as “persons and citizens obligated to allegiance” (290)—a serious undermining of the Confederacy’s own ideology of race. This change in the law’s understanding of enslaved and formerly enslaved people established a new precedent in the history not only of the Confederacy, but of the United States. By attempting to charge enslaved people as traitors under military law, the Confederacy set the precedent that they were, in fact, citizens. In McCurry’s words, “To apply the treason act to slaves in the event of rebellion was to treat them as citizens of the state in some fashion or another” (304).
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