Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World

“Today, the members of Autocracy, Inc. no longer care if they or their countries are criticized or by whom […] The leaders of China and Russia have spent a decade disputing the human rights language long used by international institutions, successfully convincing many around the world that the treaties and conventions on war and genocide—and concepts such as ‘civil liberties’ and ‘the rule of law’—embody Western ideas that don’t apply to them.”

Applebaum illustrates how modern autocrats have become impervious to external criticism, reflecting a significant break from past concerns over international reputation. These leaders rely on nationalist narratives, dismissing critiques as irrelevant or rooted in foreign agendas, which allows them to justify their actions and entrench their power domestically. By reframing concepts like human rights and civil liberties as Western constructs, they challenge global norms and insulate their regimes from the moral authority of international institutions.

“Russia plays a special role in the autocratic network, both as the inventor of the modern marriage of kleptocracy and dictatorship and as the country now most aggressively seeking to upend the status quo. The invasion was planned in that spirit. Putin hoped not only to acquire territory, but also to show the world that the old rules of international behavior no longer hold.”

Applebaum highlights Russia’s unique influence in shaping the current autocratic landscape, where kleptocracy and dictatorship are intertwined for strategic advantage. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is portrayed as a deliberate effort to dismantle the post-Cold War international order, challenging established norms around sovereignty and global governance. By rejecting these old rules, Russia seeks to assert a new paradigm where power, wealth, and territorial ambition dictate global politics.

“During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S.S.R. supported terrorist groups in West Germany and Italy, aided extremist movements across the Continent and around the world, and suppressed political opposition in Eastern Europe, including East Germany. Nevertheless, gas kept flowing west and hard currency flowed east, providing Moscow with funding that helped sustain the same Red Army that NATO had to be prepared to fight and the same KGB that Western security services competed against.”

Applebaum exposes the contradictions in Western policy during the Cold War, where economic interdependence with the Soviet Union persisted despite geopolitical hostility, reflecting The Complicity of Democratic Nations in Empowering Autocratic Regimes. This paradox reflects how economic pragmatism often overrode ideological conflict, with Western nations inadvertently strengthening the very regime they were opposing militarily. The unresolved tension between economic cooperation and political confrontation raises questions about the long-term costs of such engagement, suggesting that material interests sometimes undermine broader strategic goals.

“Bill Clinton, a president of a different generation and a different political persuasion, declared that ‘growing interdependence would have a liberalizing effect in China […] Computers and the Internet, fax machines and photo-copiers, modems and satellites all increase the exposure to people, ideas, and the world beyond China’s borders.’ In 2000, when arguing for China to be admitted to the World Trade Organization, he stated this case even more emphatically. ‘I believe the choice between economic rights and human rights, between economic security and national security, is a false one[.]’”

This quote critiques the optimism of the Clinton administration’s belief that economic interdependence would inevitably lead to political liberalization in China. This assumption reflects a broader Western confidence that technological and economic integration is automatically aligned with human rights and democratic values. This approach now seems overly simplistic, given China’s ability to grow economically while tightening political control and defying liberalization.

“Even as Western political leaders spoke about ‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ in Russia, Western companies and financial institutions were helping build autocracy and lawlessness, and not only in Russia. Before the British handed Hong Kong back to China, some British and other foreign businessmen were less than enthusiastic about democratic reforms in the colony, because they were hoping to establish relationships with the new regime. Chris Patten has written that even some British civil servants felt the same way.”

Applebaum discusses the entanglement between authoritarian regimes and global financial systems, highlighting how both operate through cynical self-interest rather than democratic ideals. Economic actors, even in democratic countries, often undermine efforts to promote democracy when financial interests align with authoritarian regimes, reflecting The Complicity of Democratic Nations in Empowering Autocratic Regimes.

“[T]here were no accidental victors in Russian elections, because there were no accidental candidates. The semblance of choice was carefully preserved through the emergence of regime-sanctioned opponents who never challenged the status quo. Meanwhile, genuine opponents of the Kremlin were beaten up at demonstrations, jailed, harassed, and insulted. In 2013, Alexei Navalny […] was allowed to run for mayor of Moscow in order to give a veneer of legitimacy to the race, but he attracted too much support. During that campaign he was convicted on fake charges of corruption; immediately afterward, he was placed under house arrest.”

Applebaum discusses the performative nature of Russian elections, where the appearance of democracy is deliberately manufactured to deceive both domestic and foreign observers. By controlling the selection of candidates and sanctioning only those who pose no real threat, the regime preserves the illusion of choice while engaging in The Silencing of Political Dissent. Alexei Navalny’s rise exposes the regime’s vulnerability when an opponent gains real traction. Hence, the regime’s response is excessively harsh.

“Most citizens in the world’s democracies are vaguely aware of this alternate universe, but they imagine it exists in faraway countries or on exotic tropical islands. They are wrong. In October 2021, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists […] published excerpts from the Pandora Papers, a large cache of documents detailing the operations of tax havens and the people who keep money in them. Among other things, the records made clear how much clandestine financial traffic goes not just through the Caribbean, but through the United States and Great Britain.”

Applebaum challenges the misconception that corruption and secretive financial practices are confined to distant, less-developed regions, revealing that tax havens and illicit financial flows are deeply embedded within major Western democracies. The Pandora Papers expose how the global elite exploit legal loopholes in countries like the US and the UK, demonstrating that these nations are complicit in sustaining the shadowy financial networks that facilitate corruption.

“[A] state that is a member of Autocracy, Inc., also has other options. There are friends and trading partners to be found among other sanctioned states, and companies not just unbothered by corruption but happy to encourage it and to participate themselves. Even as North American, South American, and European firms began pulling out of Venezuela […] Russian companies, acting at their own behest as well as on behalf of the state, stepped in to replace them.”

This quote emphasizes how autocratic states form a resilient economic network, supporting each other when cut off from Western markets, thereby circumventing sanctions and isolating pressure. Russian companies’ involvement in Venezuela illustrates how autocracies can step in where Western firms retreat, using economic and military investments to solidify alliances and expand influence. This cooperation both undermines international efforts to punish rogue regimes and enables the survival of corrupt governments by fostering a mutually-beneficial system of trade.

“Financial systems around the world had accustomed themselves to kleptocratic cash. Between 1980 and 2002, new kinds of states emerged, not just tax havens, but ‘bridging jurisdictions,’ as a National Endowment for Democracy study calls them. These are hybrid states that are a legitimate part of the international financial system, that trade normally with the democratic world, that are sometimes part of democratic military alliances, but that are also willing to launder or accept criminal or stolen wealth or to assist people and companies that have been sanctioned.”

Applebaum points to the evolution of global financial systems and illustrates how certain states act as intermediaries that blend legitimacy with corruption. This facilitates the flow of kleptocratic wealth. This dynamic normalizes corrupt practices within the global economy and exposes the complicity of these states in undermining international norms, as they profit from their ambiguous position between legality and exploitation, further entrenching autocratic power.

“While we were still rhapsodizing about the many ways in which the internet would spread democracy, the Chinese were designing the system sometimes known as the Great Firewall of China […] China’s system of internet management […] contains many different elements, beginning with an elaborate system of blocks and filters that prevent internet users from seeing particular words and phrases. Among them, famously, are the words ‘Tiananmen,’ ‘1989,’ and ‘June 4,’ but there are many more.”

Applebaum contrasts the West’s early optimism about the internet’s democratizing potential with China’s strategic development of a sophisticated censorship apparatus to enable The Silencing of Political Dissent. The Great Firewall is more than a mere barrier to information, it is a comprehensive system of control designed to manipulate online discourse and prevent the spread of politically-sensitive topics. By shaping conversations and limiting access to historical truths, China has turned the internet into a tool of state control, demonstrating that technology can be harnessed to suppress democratic ideals.

“China absorbed the technology it needed and then eased the foreign companies out. Google struggled to adhere to the Great Firewall’s rules before giving up in 2010, following a cyberattack orchestrated by the People’s Liberation Army […] China banned Facebook in 2009 and Instagram in 2014. TikTok, although invented by a Chinese company, has never been permitted to function in China at all.”

This quote illustrates how China strategically used foreign technology companies to acquire expertise before systematically excluding them. The struggles of companies like Google and Facebook highlight the challenges of balancing market access with the demands of authoritarian censorship, as they either compromise their values or withdraw. China’s refusal to allow even its own globally popular platforms like TikTok to operate domestically underscores its intent to tightly regulate information flows and maintain The Silencing of Political Dissent. Critics often point to the internal regulation of TikTok in China to argue that China’s exports are aimed at manipulating the populations of other countries, while tightening control inside its own borders.

“It’s a matter of time before these ideas spread further, tempting the leaders of democracies too […] Pegasus mobile phone spyware, created by the Israeli company NSO, has been used to track journalists, activists, and political opponents in Hungary, Kazakhstan, Mexico, India, Bahrain, and Greece, among others […] Debate over what information the American government should and should not retain about American citizens became, in 2013, the subject of an international scandal when Edward Snowden, a contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA), revealed the NSA’s methods and tactics and at the same time published thousands of documents detailing American military operations around the world. Snowden fled to Russia, where he remains.”

Applebaum warns that the temptation to use advanced surveillance technology is not limited to autocracies, as democracies, too, can exploit it to undermine political opposition and civil liberties. The examples of Pegasus spyware and the NSA’s controversial activities reveal how even democratic governments can erode privacy and freedoms, raising concerns about the growing potential for surveillance abuse in the digital age. This point is part of Applebaum’s greater argument that her analysis of autocracy does not imply a world divided into two parts, autocrats and democrats. Rather, she argues, the autocratic structures are active inside many democratic countries, while pro-democracy movements also often arise under the utmost repression.

“The lesson for Autocracy, Inc., was ominous: even in a state where surveillance seems total, the experience of tyranny and injustice can always radicalize people. Anger at arbitrary power will always lead someone to start thinking about some other system, some better way to run society. The strength of these demonstrations and the broader anger they reflected were enough to spook the Chinese authorities into lifting the quarantines and allowing the virus to spread. The deaths that resulted were preferable to public anger and protest.”

Applebaum argues that even the most repressive regimes cannot fully suppress the human impulse to resist tyranny when faced with injustice. The Chinese government’s reaction to protests during its strict COVID-19 quarantine measures illustrates how fear of public dissent can outweigh the fear of public health consequences, demonstrating the fragility of authoritarian control. By prioritizing The Silencing of Political Dissent, the regime reveals its vulnerability to collective anger, proving that popular discontent remains a potent force even in highly-surveilled societies.

“[M]any of the propagandists of Autocracy, Inc., have learned from the mistakes of the twentieth century. They don’t offer their fellow citizens a vision of utopia, and they don’t inspire them to build a better world. Instead, they teach people to be cynical and passive, because there is no better world to build. Their goal is to persuade people to mind their own business, stay out of politics, and never hope for a democratic alternative.”

This quote discusses how modern autocracies have shifted from promoting utopian visions to fostering cynicism and passivity among their citizens, reflecting a new approach to The Silencing of Political Dissent. This strategy of disillusionment is designed to discourage political engagement, reinforcing the narrative that their flawed, authoritarian rule is preferable to the perceived chaos and weakness of democracy.

“Most of the material produced is not sophisticated, but then it is also not expensive. The politicians, ‘experts,’ and media groups that use it are both real and fake. The latter sometimes hide their ownership using the same malleable company laws as kleptocratic businesses. Instead of money laundering, this is information laundering. The goal is to spread the same narratives that autocrats use at home, to connect democracy with degeneracy and chaos, to undermine democratic institutions, to smear not just activists who promote democracy but the system itself.”

By analyzing how modern autocracies engage in The Use of Disinformation to Further Autocratic Interests, Applebaum advances the idea that information has become as important as economic means in the efforts to either protect or usurp democracy. By amplifying anti-democratic messages through real and fake outlets, autocracies strategically undermine democratic ideals, promoting their own model of governance as a stable alternative while destabilizing democratic societies.

“Instead of human rights, which are monitored by outside organizations and independent agencies and can be measured against international standards, China wants to prioritize the right to development, which is something that can be defined and measured only by governments. China also relies heavily on the word sovereignty, which has many connotations, some of them positive. But in the context of international institutions, ‘sovereignty’ is the word that dictators use when they want to push back against criticism of their policies, whether it comes from UN bodies, independent human rights monitors, or their own citizens.”

By twisting the meaning of “sovereignty,” China shifts focus away from human rights standards, which are internationally monitored, to a concept of government control, insulating the regime from external accountability. The concept of “sovereignty” is one of many such concepts whose meaning has been twisted to mean something opposed to its initial significance.

“A multipolar world is meant to be fair and equitable, unlike the America-centric world, or the American hegemony they are trying to abolish. The word is especially useful because it is often used, neutrally, to express the idea that there are more nations with international clout than there were in the past, which is merely an accurate observation. ‘We are moving towards a multipolar world,’ said the UN secretary-general, António Guterres, in 2023. This idea is hardly novel: the journalist Fareed Zakaria published a book describing the ‘rise of the rest,’ the growing power of new global powers, more than fifteen years ago.”

Much like China’s focus on the term “sovereignty,” Russia’s use of the term “multipolarity” is a strategic narrative shift designed to challenge US and Europe’s perceived dominance by offering a seemingly equitable alternative. By promoting a world order that appears more balanced and inclusive, Russia seeks to position itself as a key player in this emerging multipolar structure, appealing to global audiences disillusioned with supposed American hegemony. This framing, Applebaum argues, exploits a neutral-sounding term to advance Russia’s geopolitical agenda.

“That Lukashenko was willing to falsely detain and possibly endanger a European-owned, European-registered airplane carrying mostly European citizens from one European nation to another meant both that he was prepared for a total break with Europe and that he was completely confident of economic and political support from the autocratic world […] The Belarusian dictator was protected by ‘sovereignty’ and by his friends.”

Applebaum points to the blatant illegitimacy of Lukashenko’s hijacking of a European flight in his quest to engage in The Silencing of Political Dissent. This illustrates the impunity enjoyed by autocrats who are shielded by the support of like-minded regimes and the concept of “sovereignty.” More than the solidarity with other autocrats, this situation exposes the limits of international accountability.

“In September 2018, the United Nations stepped in to de-escalate the situation in Idlib, the northwest region of Syria. ‘De-escalation’ is a euphemism: it’s what happens when diplomats can’t stop a war but are trying to save people’s lives anyway. Syria was an active war zone, convulsed by violence since 2011. In that year the Syrian dictator had turned against peaceful demonstrators who were hoping to end his brutal regime […] [P]ropped up by propaganda, surveillance technology, and economic aid from the autocratic world, Assad was saved in a less subtle manner, by Russian and Iranian bullets.”

Applebaum underscores the violent support that autocrats like Assad receive from other authoritarian regimes, contrasting it with the more covert forms of assistance given to other dictators. This situation marks an escalation of the actions that autocrats are willing to take to preserve their power.

“Like the founders of so many other successful start-ups, the original investors in Wagner’s African operation appear to be contemplating the creation of a franchise […] [offering] to sitting dictators and would-be dictators […] a ‘regime survival package.’ This bundle of aid can include personal protection for the dictator; violent assaults on his political enemies; help in fighting an insurgency; broadcast or social media campaigns that echo the themes of multipolarity and anticolonialism; kleptocratic contacts that help the elite hide money (and possibly benefit the Russians as well).”

This quote draws a comparison between Russia’s Wagner Group (See: Index of Terms) and a startup to illustrate how autocratic survival strategies are being systematized and exported across Africa. The description of Wagner’s offer as a “regime survival package” employs corporate language to highlight its transactional, profit-driven aspects. Applebaum’s description emphasizes the pragmatic and mercenary nature of Russia’s involvement.

“The display of symbols—badges, flowers, logos, colors—to force people to take sides is only one of many tactics that spread from one democratic movement to another in the last decades of the twentieth century and the first decades of the twenty-first from the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to the post-Soviet world to the Middle East […] The Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980—81 created explicit relationships between shipyard workers in Gdańsk, led by the electrician Lech Wałęsa, and the union’s ‘advisers,’ who were journalists, lawyers, and historians from Warsaw.”

Applebaum discusses how democratic movements across different regions have shared tactics, such as the use of symbols and alliances between diverse social groups, to galvanize resistance and build solidarity. The historical examples, such as the Hungarian revolution and Poland’s Solidarity movement, emphasize how uniting intellectuals and workers is a crucial strategy for challenging authoritarian regimes.

“The most sophisticated modern smear campaigns have one additional purpose: they encourage new forms of mass participation. At the height of the Cultural Revolution in Mao’s China, workplaces and schools were encouraged to identify class enemies and conduct struggle sessions, during which the enemies were accused of real or imagined thought crimes, humiliated, and sometimes beaten and tortured by their colleagues and classmates. But Maoist struggle sessions took place in a single room. The internet now makes it possible for anyone to join, even anonymously. Participants can contribute their own original memes and slogans, reveling in xenophobic or misogynist themes that would otherwise be taboo.”

This quote discusses the evolution of smear campaigns from physical, localized events to the vast, anonymous, and digital spaces of the internet, which amplify their reach and participation. The parallel structure comparing Maoist-era tactics to modern online campaigns emphasizes how technology has transformed and democratized the act of public shaming and ideological enforcement. The normalization of this discourse reflects The Use of Disinformation to Further Autocratic Interests.

“In no sense is the modern competition between autocratic and democratic ideas and practices a direct replica of what we faced in the twentieth century. There are no ‘blocs’ to join and no Berlin Walls marking neat geographic divides. Many countries don’t fit comfortably into either category, democracy or autocracy. As I’ve written, some autocracies—the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Vietnam—seek cooperation with the democratic world, don’t want to upend the UN Charter, and still see the advantages of international law. Some democracies—Turkey, Israel, Hungary, India, the Philippines—have elected leaders who are more inclined to break conventions on human rights than to uphold them. Because autocratic alliances are largely transactional, they can shift and change, and often do.”

Applebaum emphasizes the complexity and fluidity of the current global struggle between autocracy and democracy, which lacks the clear divisions of the past. Her examples of Turkey, Israel, Hungary, India, and the Philippines blur the lines between democracy and autocracy and emphasize the ambiguity of modern governance, where cooperation and alliances are increasingly transactional rather than ideologically-driven.