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David HumeA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
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Hume addresses the possibility of miracles along with evidence for Christianity, which he calls “less than the evidence for the truth of our senses” (79). Experience is not the only trustworthy guide in these matters and “is not altogether infallible” (79). When it comes to the truth of things, the probability of what is more likely to occur must always be the arbiter between one’s experience and another’s testimony.
A miracle subverts the common course of natural events—otherwise it would not be called a miracle. Logically, the repeated, experiential knowledge of a miracle argues against its existence, since miracles are rare. Hume discusses how some so-called miracles directly contradict others. One would have to deny the existence of miracles for some groups and affirm them for others, pushing the likelihood of miraculous events even further down.
Human beings always want to confirm what is dramatic and novel—“the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder” (91).
In the past, philosophy had sprung from an era and “country of freedom and toleration” (96). Persecutions of philosophies and philosophers arise from passion and emotion, not rational objection and consideration. In an imagined dialogue between a friend and Hume, the conversation involves a discussion on the creation of the world and the apparent design of the universe, leading the religious philosophers to ask “if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms” (98) rather than the happenstance of chance.
The primary rational discussion of the existence of God is taken from nature. One can’t posit the existence of God since one only has firsthand experience of the effect. Similarly, questions of the afterlife have to be left unanswered; there is nobody who has any experience with such a state.
Hume poses a question to his imagined interlocutor. He posits the existence of a “half-finished building” (104). He asks if one can infer the existence of an architect, similar to inferring the existence of a divine creator. Hume’s interlocutor says that one can’t assume God’s existence due to the lack of firsthand knowledge and experience.
Hume divides his conclusion into three parts. The first outlines and runs through various forms of skepticism and the work of the skeptic, who is dubbed the “enemy of religion” (109). Hume argues that radical skepticism—such as that advocated by Descartes where one’s whole mental process and existence is questioned—is unreasonable. A “more moderate” skepticism, on the other hand, is necessary for the practice of philosophy and investigative inquiry. Another form of skepticism involves a continuing questioning of one’s findings “consequent to science and enquiry” (110), whereby the mind is continually challenged and conclusions continually tested.
Hume questions the most radical form of skepticism. The senses are not reliable in every instance. However, radical skepticism is something from which “no durable good” can ever come (116). No action could be taken otherwise.
In the final part, Hume summarizes his thoughts on the human mind and its ability to come to real knowledge. What is needed is a “mitigated skepticism or academical philosophy” that doesn’t completely arrest human activity and inquiry (117). Mathematics can be wholly reliable, syllogisms are unreliable, and testimony of the remarkable results in doubt. The only thing that can be kept and relied upon is that which is composed of “abstract reasoning” and “experimental reasoning,” while anything else can be committed “to the flames” (120).
In the last three chapters of his work, Hume embarks on his final objections to the instances in which experience can be deceptive, concluding on the limited scope of human knowledge. In the text, Hume spends a great deal of time arguing how experience gives us the ability to expect the concurrence of events; the greater our experience the greater our ability to recognize patterns and know when things are true or false. However, human experience is not infallible. In the case of so-called miracles, experience has to be balanced against the low-to-impossible probability of events.
So-called miracles cancel one another out. A miracle in one religion necessarily negates the miracle of all other religious traditions. To claim validity for one set of miracles is to automatically discount and reject all other claims as false, superstitious, or manipulative. In the end, there can’t be any reliable testimony for the miraculous. To embrace the reality of the miraculous would be to negate the entirety of one’s other experiential knowledge, which in turn would negate one’s ability to have any experience at all.
Since it is human nature to elevate and gravitate toward the preposterous and marvelous, miraculous claims will never be in short supply. In the past, philosophy existed in an environment where freedom and liberty were valued. When prejudiced objections against philosophy arise—such as those which argue for the existence of God or an afterlife—they need to be recognized as rooted in human desire; there is no reason to validate them. Only the product of rational and abstract discourse—such as science or mathematics—is representative of true knowledge. Anything else can be expunged from existence as false and injurious to true knowledge and wisdom.
By David Hume