All the President's Men

The trial of the Watergate burglars begins on January 8, 1973. Seven men are on trial, including the five burglars, Howard Hunt, and Gordon Liddy. Prosecuting is the young US attorney Earl Silbert. Despite a promising start, the version of the story that Silbert lays out is a pale shadow of the vast conspiracy that Woodward and Bernstein have begun to uncover. Liddy, Silbert argues, was paid $50,000 (equivalent to more than $300,000 today) by CRP to conduct “legitimate intelligence-gathering activities” (141). This money was then spent by Liddy on his own initiative to fund the illegal Watergate break-in. This is the best-case accusation for CRP in that it exonerates senior leadership, places responsibility squarely on the shoulders of Liddy and Hunt, and neatly avoids uncomfortable questions about either the dirty tricks squads or the secret slush fund. Once the prosecution has finished with its opening statement, the burglars change their plea to “guilty.” As the burglars leave the courthouse on bail, Woodward and Bernstein agree to split up and follow the burglars. Woodward dives into the back seat of an already crowded cab but gets nothing. Bernstein follows a separate group to the airport and, on the spur of a moment, buys a ticket on the same flight. While Bernstein is kept far away from the defendants, a combination of fatigue, alcohol, and Bernstein’s fanatical insistence persuades one of the defense lawyers to let slip an important detail. In the days and weeks before the trial began, Hunt repeatedly visited the burglars in Miami and persuaded each of them to plead guilty to the charges. Each, whose loyalty to Hunt stretches back into their CIA days, agreed (142).

The story is impossible to verify, and the Post editors are still badly burned after the Haldeman story debacle. They and the reporters agree to take a 24-hour pause to better develop the story. If the Post decides to move through with the information it has, only one of the two reporters will take credit for the story on the byline. Therefore, when they refuse to disclose their sources to Judge Sirica, only one of the reporters will go to jail. The debate, however, is moot because the New York Times publishes its own story. While the Times says nothing about the Hunt conversations, it alleges that four of the burglars are still being paid by unknown sources, each man was promised $1,000 per month they spend in jail, and Hunt will again be the pay master for this scheme. It further alleges that burglar Frank Sturgis claimed that CRP chairman John Mitchell knew of the Watergate operation and encouraged them to carry out the break-in (143). This story paves the way for the Post to publish its Hunt story without risk.

In response to these outrageous claims, clear examples of obstruction of justice, Judge Sirica hauls the Watergate defenders back in front of him. The judge first questions Bernard Barker, whom he asks about “these $100 bills that were floating around like coupons” (143). Barker says that he was paid the money in an unmarked envelope in the mail but that he is aware of either the origin of the cash or its purpose. Sirica responds, “Well, I’m sorry […] I don’t believe you” (143). Judge Sirica questions the other defendants. He asks one if he or any of the other men previously worked for the CIA. The man replies, “Not that I know of” (145), despite having identified himself at the first pretrial hearing in June as a CIA consultant. The judge asks why they broke into the Watergate, and a defendant replies, “It pertained to the Cuban situation […] I will do anything to protect this country against any Communist conspiracy” (145). To a question regarding what relationship there is between the DNC and Cuban Communists comes the response, “I don’t know” (145). Sirica returns to Barker and asked him about $114,000 of CRP checks deposited into his accounts over the past few years? Barker says he does not know where the money came from but adds that “other operations” resulted in similar payments and that made the new payments seem normal. Lastly Sirica returns to the prosecutor who promised the court a full resolution of the Watergate affair. If anything, the newspaper reporting and the post-trial questioning have revealed far more questions than answers—questions of the most fundamental nature that the Justice Department and FBI, conducting what they claim was the “biggest, most-wide ranging investigation since the assassination of President Kennedy” (145), may have failed to follow up.

The trial also opens up one new interesting avenue of inquiry. Woodward and Bernstein decide to interview several people who were mentioned in passing during the trial. Many of these sources confirm that, while they do know the burglars and were in some cases aware of the intelligence operation, none were interviewed by the FBI. In one specific case, one of Hunt’s friends mentions a conversation in which Hunt complained about other persons involved in the CRP scheme. Often Hunt would use the general term “they” or “the White House” when talking about his bosses, but on this occasion Hunt specifically mentioned that presidential counsel John Ehrlichman, one half of the White House’s “Berlin Wall,” had rejected a number of Hunt’s proposals. The source goes on to say that after the break-in Hunt went into hiding until he got in touch with John Dean, the White House’s official counsel. Dean went on to participate in the FBI and White House investigations of the break-in and CRP.

Following up, Woodward contacts Deep Throat. Woodward has moved twice at this point in the investigation, yet it seems wherever he moves, Deep Throat keeps watch for the various signals. The trial renewed suspicions in former attorney general John Mitchell and special counsel Charles Colson, who both seemed to lurk around the outskirts of the break-in and whose names seemed conspicuously absent from the Watergate trial. Deep Throat confirms that Mitchell and Colson were deeply involved in the break-in. Moreover, Hunt and Liddy played their role in the operation well: They became the scapegoats for the operation, while Mitchell, Colson, and their White House contacts remained insulated and in the shadows. With the passing of the trial, Deep Throat warns, both CRP and the White House will be emboldened to attack the Post and snuff out the last whisp of scandal (150). Woodward returns to the office and shares his notes with Bernstein, who jumps on the information and crafts a wide-reaching story that levels numerous accusations against Mitchell and the White House. Woodward balks; he is concerned that much of the information was not confirmed and will further discredit their reporting. The fight this disagreement produces is the hottest and the sharpest the two have, but ultimately they fall back on the agreement they made: If either is uncertain about a story, neither will publish. The story is shelved.

Deep Throat’s fear that the Post has become the last line of resistance against the dirty tricks squad is unfounded. Just days later, North Carolina senator Sam Ervin summons Woodward for a consultation. The Senate, Ervin reveals, is interested in picking up the Watergate affair where the trial left off. The Senate Select Committee will have $500,000 (more than $3 million in today’s dollars) to conduct a preliminary investigation, which the senator promises will be thorough and will follow all leads. Senator Ervin has consulted with many of the top Watergate reporters and wants to know if Woodward or the Post is willing to share any information with the committee to help get it off the ground. The question is uncomfortable; just weeks prior, Woodward was prepared to go to jail to protect his sources from Judge Sirica. Now, however, it seems as if a true investigation is about to begin, and the Post team knows where many of the skeletons are buried. Woodward follows a middle ground. He reveals that Hugh Sloan, who previously expressed a desire to speak to investigators, was a key source for the reporting. The other sources were either already named in reporting or are too sensitive to share even with the Senate. Woodward does share many of his ideas regarding the break-in and exchanges theories with Ervin and his aides. On February 5, Ervin introduces his resolution to the Senate. Minority leader Hugh Scott (R-PA) denounces it as “wild, unbelievable” and an attempt to blackmail the White House and colleagues. He also floats the entirely unprecedented idea that Republicans were wire-tapped during the 1968 election. The resolution passes unanimously, though many Republicans abstain from voting (153).

The trial absorbed much of the attention surrounding the Watergate story, but it produced few new stories for the paper. Instead, the reporters return to the advice given to them by Source Z. They pursue the other crimes and dirty tricks committed by Hunt and Liddy. In starting with Hunt, Liddy, and the burglars, this new phase of the investigation feels in a way it is like restarting the story. First Woodward has lunch with an associate of Hunt’s who views himself as the friend of a major celebrity. He tells Woodward that Hunt bragged about his sophisticated eavesdropping equipment and frequently complained about his bosses, always anonymously named “they.” A woman tells both reporters that Hunt assigned her to research Ted Kennedy and dig up dirt on him. Hunt ate up a scandalous story about both Ted and John Kennedy that dated back to 1956 (155). She also points the reporters to Dita Beard. Beard wrote a memo in 1972 that leaked to the press and accused the Nixon administration of trading campaign contributions for access to the President. Hunt was ordered, alleged by Chuck Colson, to persuade Beard to recant the story. Days later she declared the memo a forgery and the story a hoax. The same day Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott read Beard’s denunciation on the floor of the Senate. There were also more sinister whispers that the group’s activities dated back well before the election season dirty tricks. Some suggested that the Plumbers, as they came to be known, had formed years earlier and took advantage of Nixon’s broad “national security” wiretapping doctrine to spy on domestic actors, protestors, and reporters. While the stories are hard to substantiate in isolation, they add up to a very clear picture that the Plumbers, under Liddy and Hunt’s leadership, were active for many years prior to Watergate.

In the wake of these stories, the White House escalates its pressure against the Post. Catching the newsroom by surprise, White House lawyers issue subpoenas for all of the documents and notes related to the Post’s Watergate stories, including Woodward and Bernstein’s transcripts of sources, their lists of phone contacts, and boxes of evidence that will reveal to the world whom they have been talking to. While th request is probably illegal, challenging the White House’s attempt would take days or months, in which time the damage would be done. Luckily the subpoenas were written for each individual reporter, not for the Post itself. Rather than give up their files, Woodward and Bernstein are both sent on extended vacations while the Post challenges the move in courts.

The reporters continue their exploration of the Plumbers’ many operations on their return from tropical exile. A college student reports to Woodward that he was hired by CRP and paid $150 a week to spy on a group of Quaker protestors who held a 24-hour peace vigil in front of the White House. The student was asked to infiltrate the group, report on the members’ activities and personal lives, then assist CRP in fabricating drug charges against the group’s leaders (160). Another worked to infiltrate radical groups on campus to discredit McGovern’s supporters. The leader of CRP’s college outreach program claims that he spent $8,400 in cash to hire college students to stuff envelopes so that the president would appear more popular in a local newspaper’s Vietnam straw poll. Another $4,000 was spent to take out an ad in the New York Times to spread the impression that the newspaper was widely unpopular with average Americans. Both operations were paid for in cash in the same manner as the other dirty tricks operations. While the stories focus on lower-level dirty tricks, they continue to widen the scope of CRP operations. Furthermore, according to Post editor Barry Sussman, these stories are the exact type that most readers will respond to. Religious matters are clearly sacred, and public opinion is supposed to represent the opinion of the public. In both cases, CRP subverted these widely held principles.

Outside the newsroom, other seemingly unrelated developments occur that have tremendous impact on the Watergate investigation. Patrick Gray, now acting director of the FBI, is nominated to formally take over the position. The White House praises Gray for handling the FBI after the death of legendary Director-for-Life J. Edgar Hoover. In the wake of the nomination, Woodward meets with Deep Throat, who paints a different picture. Gray, Deep Throat claims, got the position because he blackmailed Nixon with Watergate material (164). Deep Throat also claims that Gray was one of the first people to work on the wiretapping and electronic surveillance project. Deep Throat suggests that the whole project began in 1969 and underwent several evolutions as the President experienced different domestic challenges. That is a huge revelation, but Deepthroat suggests a flood is coming.

Gray’s Senate confirmation hearings begin on February 28. More than any other moment, the Gray nomination is the beginning of the end of the Nixon administration. Chewing throat lozenges the whole time, Gray moves like an elephant from one sensitive topic to another. He claims that the Watergate investigation, which Judge Sirica resoundingly criticized, was a “full-court press.” The FBI investigated with “no holds barred” (165). In the very next sentence, he reveals he turned over sensitive FBI files and Howard Hunt’s notebooks to White House counsel John Dean and cannot say whether Dean revealed the files to suspects in the investigation. That admission in itself is laden with hidden meaning. Gray is 20 years older than Dean and in charge of the most powerful investigatory agency in America, yet he turned over files to one of the President’s junior lawyers who was conducting his own internal investigation of the break-in. When Bernstein calls the White House for comment, they claim they never had the files. Hunt’s lawyer tells the reporters he feels the notebooks were illegally seized by the FBI in the first place and planned to object to their use at trial. Since the notebooks were not used, there was no need to contest them or have the FBI produce them (166). At that moment, Dean and the White House are inextricably pulled into the Watergate investigation. On March 2 Nixon asserts executive privilege, blocking Dean’s ability to testify. On March 22 Gray further testifies that he believes that Dean probably lied in his interviews with the FBI.

Overshadowing the Dean case is Gray’s testimony on March 6. In the afternoon he provides the Senate and reporters with copies of a transcript of a communication between Herbert Kalmbach, the president’s personal lawyer, and the FBI. In it, Kalmbach details how in September of 1971 he recruited then Army captain Donald Segretti to head up an undercover team. Kalmbach also suggested to Segretti at the time that the White House was behind the operation. In an afternoon, months of White House denials of Post stories are proven untrue. Indeed, the Kalmbach interview proves that the dirty tricks squad was not just the result of rogue CRP agents, or even of CRP itself. Rather, members of Nixon’s inner circle both within the administration and without participated in the scheme. Gray’s testimony also thrusts Senator Ervin’s select committee into the central spotlight of the Watergate investigation. The dam has burst, and a tsunami of information is about to hit.