A Promised Land

Part 2, “Yes We Can,” focuses on Obama’s campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination and his run for the presidency. Important themes from previous chapters come the fore in this section, notably race. In Chapter 6, for example, Obama discusses the racism he and his team encountered campaigning in predominantly White parts of Iowa. They faced racial hostility from Republicans. Even would-be supporters used racial slurs: “‘Yeah, I’m thinking about voting for the [N-word]’ was heard more than once” (115). Casual racism was common among White voters: “I don’t think of him as being Black, really … I mean, he’s so intelligent” (115). By in large, however, Obama found White Iowans open to his candidacy and less concerned about his Blackness and Muslim-sounding name than they were about his policies, lack of experience, and youth. Obama downplayed topics that might be seen as racial grievance to avoid dividing voters along racial lines. He recognized that for racial progress to occur, he first needed to win.

Obama’s relationship with Black voters was equally complex. Sections of the Black community embraced him from the time he was elected to the US Senate. Local chapters of the NAACP reached out to give him awards, his photo regularly appeared in Ebony and Jet, and countless elderly Black women told him he reminded them of their sons. Black voters spoke to him about their pride and hopes surrounding his candidacy, as well as the symbolism of a Black man rising to the top of the American political system. However, not all segments of the Black community were optimistic about Obama’s future. Some warned him not to take the Black vote for granted. Others feared he was asking for too much, too soon: “Nothing in Black people’s experience told them that it might be possible for one of their own to win a major party nomination, much less the presidency […] What Michelle and I had accomplished was already something of a miracle. To aspire beyond that seemed foolish, a flight too close to the sun” (116). Obama refers to this attitude as protective pessimism, that is, a desire to protect Obama from disappointment and danger. One Black congressman spelled out this idea with a stern warning: “The country’s not ready yet […] and the Clintons have a long memory” (117). In addition to protective pessimism and casual racism, Obama had to deal with the racial naïveté of many of his White supporters. In Chapter 6, for instance, he describes hearing young people chanting after his South Carolina win: “‘Race doesn’t matter! Race doesn’t matter!’” (128). During his victory speech, Obama didn’t have the heart to point out that a Confederate flag hung in front of the state capitol a few blocks away. In other words, “race still mattered plenty, as much as [his supporters] might want to believe otherwise” (128).

A more nefarious form of racism emerged even before Obama announced he was seeking the Democratic nomination. Chapter 7 describes the Obama team trying to quell lies coming from conservative news outlets. Of these, claims that Obama was not an American citizen (which came to be known as the birther conspiracy, or birtherism) proved to be the most tenacious. Pictures of him wearing a traditional African outfit at his Kenyan half-brother’s wedding circulated. However, technology in 2008 was not what it is today. The internet was too removed from mainstream news sources to impact voters much. Years later, however, the Tea Party resurrected birtherism, as did Donald Trump. By that point, the line between real news and internet fiction was so blurred that large swathes of the American populace believed Obama was an illegitimate, foreign-born president.

Sexism also emerges as a critical issue in Part 2. The media’s treatment of Michelle brings the issue to the fore. On the one hand, Michelle received positive news coverage during the campaign, with reporters praising her professional accomplishments and dedication to her family. On the other hand, rightwing commentators painted a negative portrait of Michelle, characterizing her as angry and referring to her as “Obama’s Baby Mama” (133). Even the New York Times criticized Michelle. Maureen Dowd, a columnist for the paper, wrote a piece describing Michelle’s teasing portrait of Obama on the campaign trail as emasculating, rather than humanizing. Michelle understood better than anyone the expectations placed on political wives. She also knew she faced extra burdens as a woman of color. Political wives had to be adoring, compliant, and charming, but not too opinionated. Moreover, Black women could be perceived as both emasculating and masculine by virtue of not meeting the prescribed standards of White femininity a beauty. Reporters pounced after Michelle made an offhand comment about being proud of the US for the first time in her adult life. They interpreted her statement as evidence of the derision the family had for the country, fueling rumors that Obama hated America and that he was not American. The media’s treatment of Michelle, then, reveals how sexism and racism can be weaponized for political gain.

Clinton faced some of the same challenges as Michelle during her run for the Democratic nomination, with pundits calling her aloof and impersonable. In Chapter 5, Obama expresses his admiration for Clinton, comparing her to his mother and grandmother: “All of them smart, ambitious women who had chafed under the constraints of their times, having to navigate male egos and social expectations. If Hillary had become guarded, perhaps overly scripted—who could blame her, given the attacks she’d been subjected to?” (88). Obama tried to defend Clinton during a debate before the New Hampshire primary, when the moderator asked her how she felt when people described her as unlikeable. Clinton answered by saying such statements hurt her feelings but that she would “try to go on” (109). Annoyed by the sexist nature of the question, Obama interjected, “You’re likeable enough, Hillary” (109). Clinton’s communication team spun the comment as patronizing and dismissive, but Obama maintains he meant to be supportive.

Obama aims to pull the curtain back on the American political process. To this end, he provides detailed accounts of life on the campaign trail. In Chapter 5, for example, he describes working 16-hour days, six-and-a-half-days a week. His schedule included hosting town halls, attending meetings, and giving press interviews, as well as traveling to and from events. Spare hours were spent making fundraising calls. Obama’s schedule was both grueling and monotonous, which soured his mood: “I missed my wife. I missed my kids. I missed my bed, a consistent shower, sitting at a proper table for a proper meal. I missed not having to say the exact same thing the exact same way five or six or seven times a day” (84). Obama also sheds light on political debates. He learned early in his political career that long, informative answers did not win points in debates: “The most effective debate answers, it seemed, were designed not to illuminate but to evoke an emotion, or identify the enemy, or signal to a constituency that you, more than anyone else on that stage, were and would always be on their side […] Whether I liked it or not, people were moved by emotion, not facts” (89). Obama also learned that voters do not want to hear candidates parrot conventional wisdom. Thus, he spoke plainly about his approach to foreign policy, which prioritized diplomacy but did not shy away from military action simply to maintain the status quo. For example, he was open to meeting with global pariahs, such as Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, if it advanced US interests, a stance his Democratic rivals vehemently opposed. Voters responded to Obama’s honesty: “I would never fully convince the national pundits that I was right on these arguments, but a funny trend began to show up in the polls after each of these dustups—Democratic primary voters agreed with me” (99).

Obama stresses the innovative aspects of his campaign. In addition to courting large donors by phone and at events, he relied heavily on small, internet donations. This grassroots approach gave voters a sense of ownership in Obama’s success, as evidenced by the messages that accompanied the donations. These small donors also made Obama and his team feel supported: “This is not all up to you, these donations told us” (91). Obama continued to rely on technology during his campaign for the Democratic nomination. “The extraordinary youth of my team allowed us to embrace and refine the digital networks that Howard Dean’s campaign had set in motion four years earlier. Our status as upstarts forced us to trust, again and again, the energy and creativity of our internet-savvy volunteers” (130). The internet fueled Obama’s operation by attracting donations and helping to spread his message in ways traditional media outlets could not. Obama supporters created a new, online community out of people previously isolated from one another.

Obama excels at explaining difficult topics in accessible ways. For example, he opens Chapter 9 with an anecdote about refinancing his mortgage and taking out a home equity loan. He describes the process as easy and entirely lacking in checks by appraisers. He provided three months of pay stubs and a few bank statements before walking out of his mortgage broker’s office with a $40,000 check. This anecdote helps explain the housing market crash of 2008. Obama explains that banks traditionally held the mortgage loans they made. In the period leading up to the crash, however, large numbers of mortgages were bundled and sold as securities on Wall Street. This practice insulated banks from borrowers who defaulted on their loans, which led to the loosening of lending standards—which led to riskier loans. Global investors bought these securities, which were stamped as AAA (least risky) by credit rating agencies. Authorized by Congress to purchase qualified mortgages to encourage homeownership, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were deeply implicated in the subprime market. Unqualified buyers flooded the market and eventually defaulted on their loans. Investors realized their AAA securities were actually high-risk and sold them off, triggering a market panic that resulted in the worst economic crisis in generations. Although Obama did not default on his loan, his anecdote nevertheless exemplifies the dangers of lax lending standards.

Part 2 emphasizes Obama’s commitment to putting the interests of the country over those of his party. As a US Senator, and in the midst of his presidential campaign, Obama voted in favor of Bush’s TARP legislation, an economic recovery bill that was unpopular with Democrats and Republicans. Obama’s commitment to doing what was best for the country stands in stark contrast to McCain, who chose Sarah Palin as his running mate despite her lack of experience. Palin was immediately out of her depth: “What became abundantly clear as soon as Sarah Palin stepped into the spotlight was that on just about every subject relevant to governing the country she had absolutely no idea what the hell she was talking about” (170). What Palin lacked in experience and intellect, however, she made up for in spunk. Large segments of the country were sick of Washington elites and politics as usual. Palin, the self-proclaimed maverick, was a perfect antidote. In the end, however, more voters were persuaded by Obama and Biden’s measured platform than McCain and Palin’s sideshow approach to politics.